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NORTH DAKOTA PROBATE CODE:
PRIOR AND REVISED ARTICLE II
ALEXANDER J. BOTI *
I. INTRODUCTION
The North Dakota Probate Code has been modeled on the Uniform
Probate Code [hereinafter U.P.C.] since July 1, 1975.1 As changes and
revisions in the U.P.C. occurred throughout the years, they were then
usually adopted in North Dakota. In 1991, the Legislature replaced its
chapter on multi-party accounts with the Uniform Nonprobate Transfers
On Death Act, which included the Uniform Multiple-Person Accounts
Act and the Uniform TOD Security Registration Act.2 In 1993, the
Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was adopted, replacing
some statutes that had been law in one form or another in North Dakota
since the last century.3
In 1990, the Uniform Law Commission substantially revised Article
II of the U.P.C. and clarified the revisions with amendments in 1991 and
1993.4 The revised Article II proposes statutes in the areas of intestate
succession, elective share, wills, rules of construction, and other donative
transfers. At its 1993 session, the North Dakota Legislature adopted
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. M.A., J.D., Fordham University.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-35-01 (1976). In addition to North Dakota, 15 states have adopted
substantial portions of the U.P.C. They are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Utah.
Uniform Probate Code, 8 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1995). Many states have adopted certain articles and
sections of the U.P.C. or revised their laws to conform to certain provisions in the U.P.C. See Roger
W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REv. 599 (1985).
2. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-31-04 to -30 (Supp. 1995). The Non Probate Transfer on Death law
avoids references to "joint accounts" and uses in its place the broader term "multiple-party account."
Id. § 30.1-31-02. The POD account (A payable on death to B) and trust account (A in trust for B) are
treated under a single law and do not have separate rules for each account. See id. § 30.1-31-04. A
form clearly defining these accounts and the rights that attach to them is set forth in the law and used
widely in North Dakota by financial institutions for their depositors. Id. § 30.1-31-05.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-02-27.1 to 4702-275 (Supp. 1995). In adopting this law, the North
Dakota Legislature repealed the restraint on the power of alienation law and adopted the common law
rule against perpetuities. Id. § 47-02-27.1. In addition, the Legislature adopted a wait and see
doctrine which saves interests that would initially be invalid under the common law rule against
perpetuities. Id. Thus, the period of time that a non-vested interest must vest in order to be valid, is if
it is certain to vest or terminate either no longer than twenty-one years after the death of a living
individual (basically the common law rule against perpetuities) or within 90 years after the creation of
the interest.
4. UNIF. PROB. CODE preface (1990) (amended 1993). The 1993 Amendments reorganized
Article 1I's elective share law. See Lawrence H. Averill, Jr. & Ellen B. Brantley, A Comparison of
Arkansas's Current Law Concerning Succession, Wills and Other Donative Transfers with Article 11 of
the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 17 U.L.A.R. L. J. 631 (1995) (providing a short history of the U.P.C.,
and a discussion of the new Article II of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code). Professor Averill is also
the author of the Uniform Probate Code in a Nutshell. See LAWRENCE H. AVERILL, JR., UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE IN A NUTSHELL (4th ad. 1996).
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most changes recommended in the revised Article II and scheduled them
to be effective on August 1, 1995.5 However, before the effective date,
the Legislature, at its 1995 session which concluded on April 7, 1995,
revised this law in the light of the 1993 amendments to Article II and in
light of having second thoughts on some sections that had been previ-
ously adopted.6 The revised law is based for the most part on the revised
Article II as amended in 1991 and 1993 and became effective on
January 1, 1996.7
The Uniform Probate Code was first promulgated in 1969 and
Article II was redesigned in 1990 to address new developments in the law
of gratuitous transfers in a modern and ever-changing society. In a
Prefatory Note, the U.P.C. commented on the direction the new Article II
took to respond to these developments:
In the twenty or so years between the original promulgation of
the Code and the 1990 revisions, several developments oc-
curred that prompted the systematic round of review. Three
themes were sounded: (1) the decline of formalism in favor of
intent-serving policies; (2) the recognition that will substitutes
and other intervivos transfers have so proliferated that they now
constitute a major, if not the major, form of wealth transmis-
sion; (3) the advent of the multiple-marriage society, resulting
in a significant fraction of the population being married more
than once and having step-children and children by previous
marriages and in the acceptance of a partnership or
marital-sharing theory of marriage.8
The first theme of attacking stringent formalities in the wills area is
not a new phenomenon. 9  Despite pleas to adopt a substantial compli-
5. Uniform Probate Code Changes, ch. 334, 1993 N.D. Laws 1143.
6. Uniform Probate Code Changes, ch. 322, 1995 N.D. Laws 942.
7. Uniform Probate Code Changes, ch. 322, sec. 28, 1995 N.D. Laws 942. In this article, the
current North Dakota probate law effective January 1, 1996 will be referred to as the "revised" law.
The previous state probate law which was in effect until January 1, 1996 will be referred to as the
"prior" law. The 1995 Cumulative Supplement of the North Dakota Century Code for title 30.1, The
Uniform Probate Code, sets forth sometimes in a single section both the law effective until January I,
1996 and the law effective on and after January 1, 1996. References to the 1995 Cumulative
Supplement of the North Dakota Century Code citations in this article reflect that distinction.
The 1995 Cumulative Supplement of the Minnesota Statutes Annotated follows a similar
classification of prior law valid until January 1, 1996 and the Minnesota revised law based on U.P.C.
Article II effective on and after January 1, 1996. MtNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-201, 524.2-110 to
524.3-1010 (Supp. 1995). Other states, in addition to North Dakota and Minnesota that have for the
most part adopted the 1990 U.P.C.'s Article II with the 1991 and 1993 amendments include Arizona,
Colorado, Montana, and New Mexico. Uniform Probate Code, 8 U.L.A. 1, 86 (Supp. 1995).
8. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, prefatory note (1990) (1993 amended).
9. See John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARv. L. REV. 489,489
(1975) (discussing the harsh formal requirements of the Wills Act).
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ance doctrine, courts have rejected such pleas and regarded the execu-
tion of a will valid only if the statute of wills is strictly followed.10
Nonetheless, the pre-1990 U.P.C. introduced a bare bones or basic
minimum requirement approach to attested wills and holographic wills."I
It also permitted a testator to devise items of tangible personal property
in a separate statement or list as long as the writing was in the handwrit-
ing of the testator or signed by the testator. 12 Any such separate writing
would previously have been declared invalid as a will because it did not
conform to the statute of wills.
The revised Article II continues to question the need for strict
formalities to be followed in the area of wills. It proposes the adoption
of a dispensing power whereby a court could find a document in com-
pliance with the law if the proponent of the document could establish by
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document
or writing to constitute his or her will. 13 Contained in the revised Article
II are the following new rules: the conscious presence test for testator's
requesting a proxy to sign a will or to assist in the revocation of a will; 14
an intent theory for nonademption of specific devises; 15 and a provision
that accepts a signing of the form of a self-proved will as a signing the
will itself.16 Some rules based on the presumed intent of the testator,
such as the revocation of a devise because of divorce or annulment, are
now also applicable to nonprobate transfers.17 The movement is to
elevate intent over formality. As Professors Langbein and Waggoner
point out: "The 1990 U.P.C. strives in a variety of places to vindicate
the transferor's intent in circumstances in which the former law might
have defeated it."18
The second theme of the revised Article II is the recognition of the
utilization of various legal devices to transfer wealth such as living trusts,
deeds, POD accounts, and insurance and annuity policies. More wealth
10. Bruce H. Mann, Formalities and Formalism in the Uniform Probate Code, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1033,1038 (1994). See also James Lindgren. The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009 (1992)
(discussing the formalities and their effect on the testator's intent). For a North Dakota case, see infra
notes 139-143 and accompanying text.
11. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-502. 2-503 (1969). The pre-1990 Code and the U.P.C. did not propose
adoption of a nuncupative will.
12. Id. § 2-513.
13. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990) (amended 1993). The document or writing could also be a
partial or complete revocation of a will, an addition to or an alteration of a will, or a partial or
complete revival of his or her formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will. Id.
See infra notes 125-130 (discussing the dispensing power).
14. See infra notes 173-175 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 133-138 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 308-312 and accompanying text.
18. John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous Transfers:
The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871,874 (1992).
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passes from generation to generation today through these nonprobate
transfers than through a will which has become only one legal device
among many in estate planning.19 The approach of Article II is thus to
accept the new playing field and to try to unify the rules of probate and
nonprobate transfers. Rules that previously were uniquely applicable
only to wills in the pre-1990 U.P.C. are now made applicable to
nonprobate transfers or in the U.P.C.'s usage to "governing instru-
ments." These rules of construction supply presumptions for the
following areas: lapse; 20 the need to survive the decedent by 120 hours;21
testamentary exercise of a power of appointment; 22 and the effect of a
divorce or annulment of a spouse. 23 Likewise, rules applicable to
nonprobate transfers are made applicable to wills such as certain rules of
construction of class gifts. 24  In a sense, the proposal of relaxing the
formalities for the execution of wills is an attempt to treat the law of wills
in a way that courts traditionally have treated nonprobate devices by
allowing documents to be reformed and by applying doctrines of
substantial compliance and harmless error to insure that the intent of the
parties is controlling.
The third theme runs mostly through the law of intestate succession
and the elective share. The changes in the relationships of married
couples to each other and to their children have demanded a new look at
how property is to be allocated at the death of one of the spouses. The
principles of equitable distribution applied when a marriage ends in
divorce provide an insight into these relationships. 25 Both spouses are
entitled to be treated as equal partners in an economic, as well as a social
sense. Children are to be protected economically as well as socially.
The family's life style has been restructured as a result of multiple
marriages, divorces and re-marriages and the increase of stepchildren
and children by a previous marriage. The idea of marital sharing or
marriage being an economic partnership is reflected in the revised
Article II's provisions on the elective share.26 Support of children in
new marital relationships is provided for in the revised intestate succes-
sion law.27
19. Id. at 875. Not all estate planners are particularly pleased with the variety of will substitutes
and other intervivos transfers involved in planning an estate. Id.
20. See infra notes 242-265 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 287-289 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 313-315 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 275-277 and accompanying text.
25. UNIt. PRoa. CODE art. II, pt. 2, gen. cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
26. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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Although these three major themes explain many changes in the
revised Article II of the U.P.C., other themes are at work in the revised
provisions. One theme protects financial institutions and purchasers for
value from being subject to liability as a result of some new changes in
the area of nonprobate transfers that extend the time for determining
the owner of certain property. For example, the application of the
requirement of survival by 120 hours for beneficiaries of insurance
policies and POD accounts, will require insurance companies and banks
to wait at least five days after a decendent's death to determine that the
proper person is given the decedent's property. Likewise, because of the
120-hour survival requirement, an individual who purchases property
within a few days after decedent's death from another who appears to be
an heir or devisee of the decedent, might in fact be purchasing from the
wrong person. To protect these payers, individuals who purchase
property for value, and other third parties, in situations where the time
for determining the true owner is extended, the revised law has, for the
most part, eliminated their exposure to any liability. They will only be
liable if they had notice, usually written notice, of the lack of entitlement
on the part of the party with whom they have been dealing. Any person
who receives benefits to which he or she is not entitled, is personally
obligated to return the amount of or the value of the benefits to the
person who is entitled to such benefits. The revised law extends this
protection to payers, purchasers and other third parties in the following
areas of law where time for determining the true owner is extended:
elective share, 28 requirement of survival by 120 hours,29 effect of homi-
cide on intestate succession, wills, joint assets, life insurance and benefi-
ciary designations, 30 revocation of probate and nonprobate transfers by
divorce, 3 1 and anti-lapse. 32
The main purpose of this paper is to present the differences between
the revised North Dakota probate law and its prior law. In a few instanc-
es, the Legislature did not follow the recommendations of the Uniform
Law Commissioners and these differences will be pointed out. The
various differences will demonstrate the need either to stay the course
with the current law or correct the law to meet the challenges of chang-
ing times.
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-08 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. I, 1996).
29. Id. § 30.1-09.1-02(5), (6).
30. Id. § 30.1-10-03(8), (9).
31. Id. § 30.1-10-04(7), (8).
32. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(4), (5).
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II. INTESTATE SUCCESSION
The major change in the revised intestate succession law concerns
the share of the surviving spouse. The shares of all other persons and
the definition of "representation" remain the same. 33
The revised intestate succession law recognizes the results of empiri-
cal studies showing that spouses who die with a will often leave all their
property to the surviving spouse and rely on that spouse to care for their
children.34 Under the revised law, the decedent's surviving spouse will
take the entire intestate estate in two situations. First, the surviving
spouse will take the entire estate if there is no descendant or parent of the
decedent surviving the decedent. Second, the surviving spouse will take
the entire estate if all the decedent's surviving descendants are also
descendants of the surviving spouse and there is no other descendant of
the surviving spouse who survives the decedent. 35 The second situation
is a major change from prior law under which the surviving spouse could
take the entire intestate estate only if there was no surviving issue or
parent of the decedent. 36
According to the revised law, the share of parents who take under
the intestate succession law is decreased and the share of a surviving
spouse in situations where there are surviving descendants of the dece-
dent or the surviving spouse from other marriages is increased. If no
descendants of the decedent survive the decedent, but the decedent is
survived by a parent, the surviving spouse takes the first $200,000 plus
three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate. 37 If all of the dece-
dent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving
spouse and the surviving spouse has one or more surviving descendants
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). Id. § 30.1-04-06 (Supp.
1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1996).
A new section has been added to the intestate succession law which authorizes negative wills.
At common law, it was generally held that even though a will disinherited an individual, if property
passed, for some reason, through the intestate succession law, that individual was nonetheless entitled
to his or her share. Under this new section, a decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right
of an individual or class to succeed to decedent's property passing by intestate succession. Provisions
in a will that guarantee that an individual or group will be effectively disinherited are: 1) "Brother Bob
is not to receive any of my property;" 2) "Brother Bob is disinherited;" 3) "I devise $10.00 to my
brother, Bob, and no more;" 4) "My brothers and sisters are disinherited." Once it is determined from
the will provision that an individual or group members who survived the decedent cannot take any of
the deceased's property that does in fact pass by intestate succession, that individual's or class's share
to which the individual or group member of that class would have succeeded passes as if that
individual or each member of that class had disclaimed the intestate share.
34. LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 74,75 (1991). See also UNIF. PROB.
CODE § 2-102 (1990) (amended 1993).
35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
37. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-02(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). Under prior law, the
surviving spouse received the first $50,000 plus one-half of the balance of the intestate share. Id.
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who are not descendants of the decedent, then the surviving spouse takes
the first $150,000, plus one-half of any balance of the intestate estate. 38
If one or more of the decedent's surviving descendants are not descen-
dants of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse takes the first
$100,000 plus one-half of any balance.39
The remaining sections naming the persons entitled to take and
determining their shares are unchanged in the revised law. If no surviv-
ing spouse survives the decedent, specified blood relatives of the dece-
dent share the decedent's estate. 40 Also the same system of representa-
tion to determine the amount of the shares that each relative will take is
maintained under the revised law. 41
The North Dakota Legislature did not adopt the definition of
representation recommended by the U.P.C. under which, for example,
grandchildren whose parents predeceased their intestate grandparent
would always take equal shares in their grandparents' intestate estate, in a
situation where a child or children of the grandparent survived that
grandparent. 42 The North Dakota Legislature did not change the
definition of representation from the pre-1990 U.P.C. under which the
houses of the grandfather's deceased children, who had children surviv-
ing the grandfather, would share equally with the grandfather's surviving
children, with the grandchildren whose parents predeceased their grand-
father taking what their parents would have taken had those parents been
38. Id. § 30.1-04-02(3).
39. Id. § 30.1-04-02(4). Under prior law, if they were surviving issue, one or more of whom
were not issue of the surviving spouse, the surviving spouse received one-half of the intestate share.
Id.
40. Id. § 30.1-04-03. This law states that:
Any part of the intestate estate not passing to the decedent's surviving spouse under section 30.1-
04-02, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes in the following order to the
individuals designated below who survive the decedent:
1. - To the decedent's descendants by representation.
-2. If there is no surviving descendant, to the decedent's parents equally of both
survive, or to the surviving parent.
3. If there is no surviving descendant or parent, to the descendants of the decedent's
parents or either of them by representation.
4. If there is no surviving descendant, parent, or descendant of a parent, but the
decedent is survived by one or more grandparents or descendants of
grandparents, half of the estate passes to the deceden's paternal grandparents
equally if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent, or to the
descendants of the decedent's paternal paternal grandparents or either of them is
both are deceased, the descendant's [sic] taking by representation; and the other
half passes to the decedent's maternal relatives in the same manner; but of there is
no surviving grandparent or descendant of a grandparent on either the paternal or
the maternal side, the entire estate passes to the decedent's relatives on the other
side in the same manner as the half.
41. Id. § 30.1-04-06. See infra note 43.
42. UNF. PROB. CODE § 2-106 (1990) (amended 1993). For a definition of this system of
representation. known as "per capital at each generation," see infra note 281.
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surviving children. 43 Thus, if a grandparent dies intestate with a distrib-
utable estate of $90,000 and is survived by one child and two grandchil-
dren from a deceased son and one grandchild from a deceased daughter,
the surviving child takes $30,000, the deceased daughter's child takes
$30,000, and the deceased son's two children take $15,000 each. Under
a per capita at each generation system of representation, all three grand-
children would receive $20,000 each, with the surviving child receiving
$30,000.
The rights of adopted children and non-marital children and their
natural parents for the purposes of intestate succession have been modi-
fied. Under both the revised and prior laws, an adopted child is the child
of an adopting parent or parents and not of the natural parents with the
exception of the case of an adoption of a child by the spouse of either
natural parent. In such a case, the adoption has no effect on the relation-
ship between the child and that natural parent or the right of the child or
descendant of the child to inherit from or through the other natural
parent. 44  The effect of this exception is that the adopted child can
inherit from three persons-the natural parents and the adopting parent.
The non-marital child who has established parentage generally inherits
by, through, and from his or her natural parents. The relationship of
parent and child, as far as a non-marital child is concerned, is still
established under the Uniform Parentage Act.a5 The change in the law is
that in the case of any child, adopted, non-marital, or otherwise, either
natural parent or the kindred of either natural parent cannot inherit from
and through that child unless that natural parent has openly treated the
child as the parent's and has not refused to support the child.4 6 Not
refusing to support the child refers to the time period during which the
parent has a legal obligation to support the child.47 The effect of this
statute extends beyond the case of an adopted or nonmarital child. It
means that all biological parents, or the kindred of either, are subject to
43. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-06 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). This statute describes
the North Dakota system of representation as follows:
If representation is called for by this title, the estate is divided into as many shares as
there are surviving heirs in the nearest degree of kinship and deceased persons in the
same degree of kinship and deceased persons in the same degree who left issue who
survive the decedent, each surviving heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and
the share of each deceased person in the same degree being divided among his issue in
the same manner.
Id.
44. Id. § 30.1-04-09(1).
45. Id. § 30.1-04-09(3). The Uniform Parentage Act lists a number of presumptions that can be
used to prove paternity. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-04 (1991 & Supp. 1995). This statute of the Act has
been held to be constitutional. B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368, 375 (N.D. 1993).
46. N.D. CENT. COoE § 30.1-04-09(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
47. UNIF. PRoB.CODE § 2-114 (1990) (amended 1993).
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the requirement of openly treating their children as their own and
supporting their children if they want to inherit from or through their
children .48
The law of advancement is treated in the chapter on intestate succes-
sion since it applies only in cases of intestate succession. The revised law
like the prior law, continues to require that in order for an advancement
made by an individual in his or her lifetime to be taken into account in
the distribution of that individual's estate, the advancement must be
declared or acknowledged in writing by that individual or the heir. The
only change in the revised law is that an advancement can be taken into
account, not only if a person dies wholly intestate, but also partially
intestate .49
III. ELECTIVE SHARE
The revised North Dakota elective share law retains the prior law's
basic structure for computing that share but at the same time makes
some significant changes and modifications. The highlights of these
changes include the following: First, the surviving spouse is now entitled
to take an elective share of one-half of the augmented estate as
compared to one-third of the augmented estate under the prior law.50
Second, the surviving spouse is guaranteed a basic supplemental share of
$50,000.51 Third, there are now four Segments of the augmented estate:
(Segment One) decedent's net probate estate; (Segment Two) decedent's
non-probate transfers to others; (Segment Three) decedent's
non-probate transfers to the surviving spouse; and (Segment Four)
surviving spouse's property and non-probate transfers to others.52 The
48. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 34, at 135-36.
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-10 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
50. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-05-01(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). The procedure for filing to take the
elective share is basically the same as under the prior law. A petition must be filed within the nine
months after the date of the decedent's death, or within six months after the probate of decedent's
will, whichever limitation expires later. Id. Under the revised law. an agent with a durable power of
attorney, guardian, or conservator of the surviving spouse may exercise the surviving spouse's right of
election. Id. In the case of an incapacitated spouse, the court will set aside the portion of the elective
share and supplemental elective share amounts and appoint a trustee to administer trust property for
the support of the surviving spouse. N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-05-06(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective January
1, 1996).
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). This supplemental
share amount is payable from recipients of decedent's probate estate and decedent's nonprobate
transfers to persons other than the surviving spouse. Id. Only if these recipients continue to have
property which was listed in the computation of the augmented estate, and which was not needed to
satisfy the elective share of one-third of the augmented estate will the surviving spouse be able to take
his or her supplemental elective share. Id. The order of priority for paying the supplemental elective
share is the same as that used to satisfy the elective share. Id. See infra, part III.B.
52. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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latter two Segments were treated as a single Segment under prior law
usually under the title of decedent's transfers to the surviving spouse and
that spouse's transfers to others. 53 Fourth, in computing the amount of
surviving spouse's property owned at death, which is includable in
Segment Four of the augmented estate, the revised law requires that the
value of all of the spouse's property be included whether or not the
property was gratuitously derived from the decedent.5 4 Under prior law,
only the surviving spouse's property gratuitously derived from the
deceased was included in the augmented estate. 55 The revised law
relieves the surviving spouse of making this complex computation and
of being subjected to a presumption that all property owned by the
surviving spouse had been derived from the decedent except to the
extent that the surviving spouse established that it was derived from
another source.5 6 Fifth, some of decedent's non-probate transfers which
were not includable in the augmented estate under the prior law are now
required to be added in the augmented estate. 57 One such non-probate
transfer is the exercise of a presently exercisable general power of
appointment. 58 Sixth, there are now three funds for satisfying the
spouse's elective share. 59  Under the prior law, there were two
funds-first, the surviving spouse's property and, second, other
recipients' share of the probate estate and the decedent's transfers of
non-probate property. 60 Under the revised law, the three funds to be
used in satisfying the elective share amount and the order in which they
are applied is as follows: (Fund #1) the amounts which pass to the
surviving spouse under the probate estate and the amounts which passed
by virtue of decedent's nonprobate transfers to the surviving spouse and
the amounts which are owned or transferred by the surviving spouse;
(Fund #2) the amounts of decedent's non-probate transfers to third
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1. 1996). The prior law
stated:
The value of the property owned by the surviving spouse at the decedent's
death, plus the value of the property transferred by the spouse at any time
during marriage to any person other than the decedent which would have
been includable in the spouse's augumented estate if the surviving spouse
had predeceased the decedent, to the extent the owned or transferred
property is derived from the decedent by any means other than testate or
intestate succession without a full consideration in money or money's
worth.
Id.
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(d) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
56. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(d)(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
57. Id. § 30.1-05-02 (2)(b).
58. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(1).
59. Id. § 30.1-05-03.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
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parties other than the surviving spouse and other than the property which
passed during the two-year period next preceding the decedent's death;
and (Fund #3) the amounts of such property which passed during the
two-year period next preceding the decedent's death.6 1
These major revisions of the elective-share law are aimed at fulfill-
ing two goals. 62 One goal is to implement the partnership or
marital-sharing theory of marriage. The North Dakota law gives a
surviving spouse a percentage of half the augmented estate while the
U.P.C. proposes a sliding scale percentage which gives the surviving
spouse half the augmented estate after 15 years of marriage. 63 The
second goal is to implement the support theory based on the mutual
duty of the spouses to support each other during their lifetimes and then
for the deceased spouse to support the surviving spouse. 64 In some
situations, one half of the augmented estate may be insufficient to
provide minimum support for the surviving spouse. To meet this need
of providing minimum support, the U.P.C. introduced the concept of
providing, where possible, a supplemental elective share of $50,000 to
the surviving spouse. 65 The North Dakota Legislature has enacted a
provision providing the supplemental elective share. 66
A. AUGMENTED ESTATE
North Dakota law gives spouses the right to take one-half of the
other spouse's augmented estate no matter how soon after the marriage a
spouse might die.67 This approach recognizes what appears to be a full
partnership from the beginning of the marriage. 68 The U.P.C., on the
other hand, makes a distinction between short term marriages and long
term marriages. For example, surviving spouses married for five years
are entitled to only 15 percent of the augmented estate. 69 A full eco-
61. Id. § 30.1-05-03.
62. See, e.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 1. 303 (1987) (addressing various problems concerning
elective-share law).
63. See infra note 69 (providing the text of the sliding scale).
64. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. (support theory) (1990) (amended 1993).
65. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing in part the supplemental elective
share).
66. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-01(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
67. Id. § 30.1-05-01(1).
68. UNIF. PROa. CODE art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. (partnership theory) (1990) (amended 1993). There
was some concern at a legislative hearing in 1993,-about legislators voting in favor of an elective
share of one-half of the augumented estate. One Senator questioned whether people are getting
married just for the estate. See 1993 Senate Standing Comm. Minutes, H.B. No. 1111, 53d Leg. Sess.
(remarks of Senator Marks).
69. UNIF. PROa. CODE § 2-202(a) (1990) (amended 1993). The U.P.C. implements an accrual
type of elective share by adjusting the elective share entitlements to the length of the marriage. The
longer the marriage the larger the elective share percentage and the more each spouse's individual
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nomic partnership is not recognized until the surviving spouse has been
married for 15 years, and at that time, that spouse is then entitled to 50
percent of the augmented estate. 70 Likewise, in reducing the elective
share by the property owned or transferred by the surviving spouse as
listed in Segment Four (property owned or transferred by the surviving
spouse) of the augmented estate, North Dakota law requires the entire
amount listed in Segment Four to be used to reduce the surviving
spouse's elective share. 71 From the outset of the marriage, this revised
law considers all the property listed in Segment Four to be marital
property and not individual property. 72 Again, North Dakota law
appears to have adopted a full economic partnership from the beginning
of the marriage. On the other hand, the U.P.C. does not require the
entire amount of property owned or transferred by the surviving spouse
includable in Segment Four to be used to reduce the elective share until
the spouses have been married for 15 years or longer.73 For example, a
property becomes marital property. Id. This sliding scale approach has been adopted in Minnesota
and Montana. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-202 (Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-221 (1995).
70. Id. The U.P.C.'s provision states:
The surviving spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in this State has a right of
election, under the limitations and conditions stated in this Part, to take an elective-share
amount equal to the value of the elective-share percentage of the augmented estate,
determined by the length of time the spouse and the decedent were married to each
other, in accordance with the following schedule:
If the decedent and the
spouse were married to The elective-share
each other: percentage is:
Less than 1 year ............... Supplemental Amount Only.
1 year but less than 2 years ...... 3% of the augmented estate.
2 years but less than 3 years ..... 6% of the augmented estate.
3 years but less and 4 years ...... 9% of the augmented estate.
4 years but less than 5 years ..... 12% of the augmented estate.
5 years but less than 6 years ..... 15% of the augmented estate.
6 years but less than 7 years ..... 18% of the augmented estate.
7 years but less than 8 years ..... 21% of the augmented estate.
8 years but less than 9 years ..... 24% of the augmented estate.
9 years but less than 10 years .... 27% of the augmented estate.
10 years but less than I I years... 30% of the augmented estate.
11 years but less than 12 years ... 34% of the augmented estate.
12 years but less than 13 years ... 38% of the augmented estate.
13 years but less than 14 years ... 42% of the augmented estate.
14 years but less than 15 years ... 46% of the augmented estate.
15 years or more .............. 50% of the augmented estate.
Id.
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-03(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
72. Id. § 30.1-05-02(c), (d).
73. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-209(a)(2) (1990) (amended 1993).
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surviving spouse who has been married for five years will only have an
amount equal to 30 percent or twice the augmented estate percentage put
in Fund # 1 and used to reduce his or her elective share. 74 Only 30
percent of the surviving spouse's property includable in Segment Four
will be considered marital property as compared to individual property
which is still considered not part of the economic partnership. Under the
U.P.C., only when the augmented estate percentage is 50 percent is the
property owned or transferred by the surviving spouse at death of the
other spouse considered to be full marital property.
The seeming reluctance of the U.P.C. and the readiness of the North
Dakota law to give full partnership to the spouses at the beginning of the
marriage may be understood by the fact that the U.P.C. requires that
more of decedent's non-probate transfers to persons other than the
surviving spouse (as listed in Segment Two) be included in the augment-
ed estate. For example, in Segment Two, the U.P.C. and the revised
North Dakota law include in the augmented estate, property over which
the decedent alone, immediately before death, held a presently exercis-
able general power of appointment. 75 The revised law, however, requires
only those such powers to be included that were "created by the dece-
dent during marriage," whereas the U.P.C. requires all such powers to be
included despite when they were created or by whom they were creat-
ed.76 Similarly, the U.P.C. and the revised law both include in Segment
Two the decedent's fractional interest in property, held by the decedent
in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Under the U.P.C., the
amount included is the full value of decedent's fractional interest,
despite when the interest was created or by whom the interest was creat-
ed; 77 under the revised law, the amount included is the value of dece-
dent's fractional interest "contributed by the decedent during the
marriage."T8 In addition, the U.P.C. includes all of Segment Two in the
74. Id. In the case of spouses who are married to each other more than five years but less than
six years, the elective share percentage for a five-year marriage is 15%. Id. § 2-202(a). If the
decedent's net probate estate passing to persons other than the surviving spouse is $400,000 and the
surviving spouse's assets is $200,000 under U.P.C. § 2-209(a)(2), the augmented estate is $600,000
and the surviving spouse's elective-share amount is $90,000 (15% of $600,000). To satisfy the
augmented estate, only twice the amount of the elective-share percentage is deducted from the
$90.000 (30% of $90,000) or $27,000. The remaining elective-share amount of $63,000 will have to
be made up pro rata from the persons receiving the decedent's net probate estate. See id. art. II, pt. 2
gen. cmt. (the support theory).
75. See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing exercisable powers held immediately
before death).
76. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(l)(a) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996)
and UNiF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(1)(i) (1990) (amended 1993).
77. UnF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(l)(ii).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(b)(l)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). For example,
under both the U.P.C. and the revised law, if the decedent contributed $50,000 toward the purchase of
Blackacre and his daughter also contributed $50,000 toward the purchase of Blackacre, with the
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augmented estate and proceeds of insurance, including accidental death
benefits on the life of the decedent, if the decedent owned the insurance
policy immediately before death or if and to the extent the decedent
alone and immediately before death held a presently exercisable general
power of appointment over the policy or its proceeds. 79 The North
Dakota Legislature did not adopt this provision.80  In North Dakota,
either spouse may come into the marriage with any of these three types
of property and not have them included in one's augmented estate.
Thus, more of a North Dakota spouse's property is shielded from being
brought into the augmented estate than a spouse whose elective share
rights are regulated by a state adopting all these U.P.C. provisions.
The basic structure of what should be included in the augmented
estate remains essentially the same under the revised North Dakota law.
The type of property transfers originally included in the augmented
estate were those considered to be the typical types used by one spouse
to disinherit the other spouse. Once certain types were denominated,
then other types of transfers were resorted to in order to keep that
property beyond the reach of a surviving spouse. The revised law
includes more types of transfers and refines some provisions to expand
or more clearly define other types that should be includable in the
augmented estate. The theory is that without such improvement, the
need of which has been experienced during the first 20 years of states
dealing with this elective share law, surviving spouses will be denied
meaningful support.
property being put in their names as joint tenants with the right of survivorship, $50,000 would be
included in the augmented estate. See id.
79. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205(l)(iv).
80. In fact, the new law explicitly states that life insurance, accident insurance, pension,
profit-sharing, retirement, and other benefit plans payable to persons other than the decedent's
surviving spouse or the decedent's estate are excluded from the decedent's nonprobate transfers.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (2)(d)(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). As a result of this
provision, anyone in North Dakota wishing to disinherit a spouse may, at any time, before or after
marriage, buy insurance for, or make benefit plans payable to persons other than the surviving spouse,
and rest assured that such amounts payable under these plans will be excluded from the augumented
estate. UN[n. PROB. CODE § 2-205(l)(iv).
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The augmented estate consists of four Segments which, when added
together, constitute the total augmented estate. 81  Fifty percent of the
total augmented estate is the elective share to which every surviving
spouse of a decedent who dies domiciled in North Dakota is entitled to
receive. The four segments of the augmented estate are as follows:
81. COMPOSITION OF AUGMENTED ESTATE
Segment One: Value of decedent's net probabte estate. $ .....
Segment Two: Value of decedent's non-probate
Transfers to others.
Part One: Property that passed outside probate
at decedent's death.
1. Property subject to decedent's presently
exercisable general power of appointment. $ .....
2. Decedent's fractional interest in jointly held
property contributed by decedent during the
marriage. $ .....
3. Decedent's ownership interest in property held
in POD, TOD, or co-ownership, with the right of
survivorship. $ .....
Part Two: Value of property transferred during
marriage.
1. Property decedent irrevocably transferred.
Retaining right to possession, employment, or
income interest. $ .....
2. Property decedent transferred retaining power
of appointment or right to revoke exercisable by
decedent alone or in conjunction with any other
person or by a nonadverse party. $ .....
Part Three: Value of property transferred by
decedent during marriage and during a two
year period next preceding decedent's death.
1. Property that would have been included in
decedent's augmented estate, had it not been
terminated before decedent's death. $ .....
2. Property transferred to extent transfers
exceed $10,000 to any one donee per year. $ .....
Segment Three: Value of property surviving spouse
receives by reason of decedent's death;
decedent's nonprobate transfers to surviving
spouse. $ .....
Segment Four: Value of surviving spouse's separate
property; spouse's assets and transfers to
others. $ .....
Total Augmented Estate $ .....
Note: The elective share is 50% of the augmented estate.
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1. Segment One
Segment One consists of the value of decedent's net probate estate
which is the gross estate reduced by funeral and administration expenses,
homestead, family allowances, exempt property, and enforceable
claims.82 If an individual receives a devise of property that is subjected
to the homestead allowance, that person will be held accountable under
the augmented estate for the commuted value of the property.83
2. Segment Two
Segment Two consists of the value of decedent's nonprobate
transfers that passed outside the decedent's probate estate. Not all such
transfers are included, only the specified types. Segment Two has been
revised and is organized under three parts.
Part One of Segment Two consists of three types of property that
passed at decedent's death to persons other than decedent's estate or
decedent's surviving spouse. The first type is property over which the
decedent alone, immediately before death, held a presently exercisable
general power of appointment created by the decedent during the
marriage. 84 The second type of property is decedent's fractional interest
in property, held by the decedent in joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship.8 5 The revised law defines "fractional interest in property
held in joint tenancy with the right of survivorship" as follows:
Fractional interest in property held in joint tenancy with the
right of survivorship, whether the fractional interest is unilater-
ally severable or not, means the fraction, the numerator of
which is one and the denominator of which, if the decedent was
a joint tenant, is one plus the number of joint tenants who
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(a) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1. 1996).
83. For discussion of homestead, family allowances, exempt property, and enforceable claims.
see infra notes 116-124 and accompanying text. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(4). This statute also
applies to determining the value of all property included in the augmented estate and states that the
value of property includes the commuted value of any present or future interest, as well as the
commuted value of amounts payable under any trust, life insurance, settlement option, annuity
contract, public or private pension, disability compensation, death benefit, or retirement plan, or
similar arrangement, exclusive of the federal security system. Id. If property can be included in
either one or more Segments of the augmented estate, the property is included under the provision
yielding the highest value, but under any one, and only one of the overlapping provisions if they all
yield the same value. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(5) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(l)(a) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). The
amount included is the value of the property subject to the power to the extent that the property passed
at the decedent's death, by exercise, release, lapse, in default, or otherwise. Id.
85. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(l)(b).
[VOL. 72:1
1996] NORTH DAKOTA PROBATE CODE
survive the decedent and which, if the decedent was not a joint
tenant, is the number of joint tenants .86
The last type of property listed is the decedent's ownership interest
in property or accounts held in POD (payable on death), TOD (transfer
on death), or co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship.
Only the value of decedent's ownership interest is included. 87 This
ownership interest may have been created before or during the marriage.
Part Two of Segment Two consists of two types of property which
the decedent transferred during marriage. The first type is "[any
irrevocable transfer in which the decedent retained the right to the
possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property, if and to
the extent that the decedent's right terminated at or continued beyond
the decedent's death." 88 The second type of property is "[a]ny transfer
in which the decedent created a power over the income or principal of
the transferred property, exercisable by the decedent alone or in con-
junction with any other person, or exercisable by a nonadverse party, for
the decedent's estate." 89
Part Three of Segment Two includes in the augmented estate any
property that the decedent transferred during the marriage and during
the two years preceding his or her death.90 In one section of Part Three
of Segment Two, the amount included is the value of the property
transferred to the extent that aggregate transfers exceeded $10,000.91
Under prior law, the amount included was the value of the property
86. Id. § 30.1-05-02(l)(a)(2). For example, if three persons were joint tenants with right of
survivorship in real property, each one's fractional interest would be one-third. Id. However, the
amount included is the value of the decedent's fractional interest contributed during marriage. Id. §
30.1-05-02(2)(b)(l)(b).
87. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(1)(c). If a mother and daughter were registered as co-owners of a
joint checking account, with the mother contributing 60% of the funds in the account and owning the
same percentage at death, then 60% of the value of the account passing to the daughter at the
mother's death is included in the mother's augmented estate. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205 (1990)
(amended 1993).
88. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(2)(a). "[T]he amount included is the value of the fraction of the
property to which the decedent's right related . I..." d. If before death and during marriage a father
created an irrevocable intervivos trust with income to the father for life and remainder to his daughter,
then at the father's death, the value of the corpus of the trust is included in the father's augmented
estate. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205 (1990) (amended 1993). Other, more complex examples involving
retained unitrust interests for a term, personal residence trusts, retained annuity interests for a term,
and commercial annuities are found in this comment. Id.
89. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02 (2)(b)(2)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996) (Supp.
1995). "[Tlhe amount included is the value of the property subject to the power... Id. If, before
death and during marriage, a mother created a revocable intervivos trust with income to her son for
life and remainder to her daughter, then at the mother's death, the value of the corpus of the trust
which was not revoked by the mother during her lifetime is included in the mother's augmented estate.
Other, more complex situations involving the exercise of joint powers in non-adverse parties are found
in the Uniform Probate Code Comment, section 2-205 (1990) (amended 1993).
90. Id. § 30.1-05-02(b)(3).
91. Id. § 30.1-05-02(b)(3)(b).
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transferred to the extent that aggregate transfers exceeded $3,000.92 In
another section of Part Three of Segment Two, the revised law addresses
the problem of interests which terminate immediately before death and
thus are not brought within the augmented estate under the other provi-
sions of Segment Two. The revised law includes in the augmented estate
any property that passed during marriage and during the two-year
period preceding the decedent's death as a result of termination of a
right or interest in, or power over, property that would have been includ-
ed in Part One or Part Two of Segment Two if the right, interest, or
power had not terminated until the decedent's death.93 The amount
included is the value of the property that would have been included
under Part One and Part Two, except that the property is valued at the
time that the right, interest, or power terminated. 94
Like prior law, all these nonprobate transfers to be included in
Segment Two must be gratuitous and made without the written joinder or
the written consent of the surviving spouse.95 To the extent that the
decedent received adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth, the value of any property is excluded from the decedent's
nonprobate transfers.96
3. Segment Three
As stated above, Segment Three and Segment Four consist of what
the prior law described as the value of the property, owned by the
surviving spouse at the decedent's death other than what was received as
probate property, "plus the value of property transferred by the spouse
at any time during the marriage to any person other than the decedent
which would have been includable in the spouse's augmented estate if
the surviving spouse had predeceased the decedent." 97 The revised law
divides the listing of spousal property into two Segments because it
follows the structure of the U.P.C. which needs two categories of proper-
ty since it does not use all marital property to satisfy the spouse's
elective share except in the case of a couple who have been married for
92. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(l)(d) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
93. Id. § 30.1-05-02 (2)(b)(3)(a).
94. Id. Consider a case in which the decedent before death and during marriage created an
irrevocable intervivos trust, with the income to himself for 10 years and then the corpus to his son.
Decedent died I I years after the trust was created, survived by his spouse to whom he was married at
the time the trust terminated. According to a U.P.C. comment, the full value of the corpus at the date
of the trust's termination is included in the augmented estate. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-205 cmt.
(1990) (amended 1993). Had the deceased income interest not terminated until the deceased's death,
the full amount of the corpus would have been included under Part One of Segment Two. Id.
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
96. Id.
97. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2).
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15 years or longer.98 Under the revised law, since all spousal property
constitutes Fund #1 to be used to satisfy the spouse's elective share, these
two Segments could have been combined. However, they will be treated
as two separate Segments in this article to reflect the separate treatment
they are given in the revised law.
Under Segment Three, the value of decedent's nonprobate transfers
that passed at the decedent's death to the surviving spouse, is included in
the augmented estate. The revised law lists a few types of these
nonprobate transfers: 1) the decedent's fractional interest in property
held as joint tenant with the surviving spouse as surviving joint tenant; 2)
the decedent's ownership interest in property or accounts held. in
co-ownership registration with the right of survivorship with the surviv-
ing spouse as a surviving co-owner; and 3) proceeds of insurance on the
life of the decedent, if the decedent owned the insurance policy immedi-
ately before death or if and to the extent that the decedent alone and
immediately before death held a presently exercisable general power of
appointment over the policy or its proceeds.99 Any type of nonprobate
property of the kind includable in Part One or Part Two of Segment Two
will be included in Segment Three if it passes on the decedent's death to
the surviving spouse.100
4. Segment Four
Under Segment Four, the augmented estate consists of the remain-
ing property that passes to the surviving spouse by reason of the dece-
dent's death and is owned by the surviving spouse at decedent's death
other than that accounted for in Segments One and Three.101 Included
are the surviving spouse's fractional interest in property held in joint
tenancy with the right of survivorship and ownership interest in property
or accounts held in co-ownership registration with the right of survivor-
ship.102 Not included are the spouse's rights to homestead, family
allowance, exempt property, or payments under the federal social
security system.103 Like the prior law, the revised North Dakota law also
adds into the augmented estate the property that would have been
98. Compare id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(b)(2),(3) and UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-209(a)(2) (1990) (amended
1993).
99., N.D. CENT. CODE § 30 .1-05-02(2)(c).
100. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(c).
101. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(d).
102. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(d)(1)(a), (b). The value of these interests is determined immediately
before the decedent's death if the decedent was then a joint tenant or a co-owner of the property or
accounts. Id. § 30.1-05-02(2)(d)(2).
103. Id. § 30.1-05-02 (2)(d)(1)(c). See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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included in the surviving spouse's augmented estate as nonprobate
transfers to others, had the spouse been the decedent.104
The elective share of the surviving spouse is one half of the sum of
the total amounts in Segments One, Two, Three, and Four and constitutes
the augmented estate. 105 The revised law stipulates three funds to be
used to satisfy the elective share.106 Fund #1 is used first to satisfy the
elective share and consists of the amounts received from the net probate
estate in Segment One and the amounts received as listed in Segments
Three and Four.10 7 If the elective share is not satisfied, then Fund #2 is
applied to satisfy the unsatisfied balance of the elective-share amount.
Fund #2 consists of the amounts included in the decedent's net probate
estate in Segment One and in the decedent's nonprobate transfers to
others in Parts One and Two of Segment Two.108 If the elective share is
still not satisfied, then Fund #3 is applied. Fund #3 consists of the
remaining nonprobate transfers in Part Three of Segment Two. 109 The
decedent's nonprobate transfers to others made during the two-year
period next preceding the decedent's death are reserved until the
amounts in Fund #2 are exhausted in satisfying the elective-share
amount.1 10 The amounts in Funds #2 and #3 are apportioned equitably
among the respective recipients in proportion to the value of their
interests in the Funds.Ill
B. SUPPLEMENTAL ELECTIVE SHARE
A surviving spouse is entitled to a supplemental elective share when
the sum of the following amounts is less than $50,000: 1) the amounts
in Segments Three and Four in the augmented estate; 2) the amounts in
Segment One of the augmented estate which pass or have passed to the
surviving spouse by testate or intestate succession; and 3) that part of the
elective-share amounts payable to the surviving spouse under Segments
One and Two in the augmented estate.112 In other words, if the surviv-
ing spouse's property which he or she owns and the property received
104. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-02(2)(d)(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective January 1, 1996). This
property, not including the spouse's fractional and ownership interests is valued at the decedent's
death, taking the fact that the decedent predeceased the spouse into account. Id.
105. See supra notes 82-104 and accompanying text.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-03(1), (2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 30.1-05-03(2).
109. Id. § 30.1-05-03(3).
110. Id. Under prior law, the amounts of all decedent's nonprobate transfers were considered as
one fund and applied to satisfy the elective-share amount in the event it was unsatisfied after the
property of the surviving spouse listed in the augumented estate was applied. N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-05-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
111. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-03(2), (3) (Supp. 1995) (effective January 1, 1996).
112. Id. § 30.1-05-01(2).
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from recipients of the decedent's nonprobate transfers to satisfy the
elective share do not add up to $50,000, then the surviving spouse is
entitled to the difference between $50,000 and total amount owned or
received from others.113
C. WAIVER OF RIGHT TO ELECTIVE SHARE
The revised law dealing with the right to waive the elective share and
other rights adds a provision which is not included in the prior law or the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.i 14 This new provision states that a
surviving spouse's waiver is not enforceable if the surviving spouse
proves that the "waiver, if given effect, would reduce the assets or
income available to the surviving spouse to an amount less than those
allowed for persons eligible for medical or other forms of assistance
from any state or federal government or governmental agency for which
the surviving spouse must qualify on the basis of need."115
113. Id. In this context, the word "owns" includes the property that would have been included in
the surviving spouse's nonprobate transfers to others had the spouse been the decedent. Id. The
following is an example of the method used to compute the supplemental elective share:
After A's death, B, [A's surviving spouse] married C. Five years later, B died, survived by C.
B's will left nothing to C, and B made no nonprobate transfers to C. B made no nonprobate transfers to
others as defined in Section 2-205.
The augmented estate is:
(1) B's net probate estate .......................... $ 60,000
(2) B's nonprobate transfers to others ................ 0
(3) B's nonprobate transfers to C .................... 0
(4) C's assets and nonprobate transfers to others ....... $ 10.000
Augmented Estate ................................ $ 70.000
The elective-share percentage is 50%. This means that C's elective-share amount is
$30,000 (50% of $70,000).
The remaining $35,000 elective-share amount would come from B's net probate estate.
Application of Section 30.1-05-01(2) shows that C is entitled to a supplemental
elective-share amount.
C's assets and nonprobate transfers to others ........................ $10,000
B's nonprobate transfers to C ..................................... 0
Elective-share amount payable from decedent's probate estate ......... $35,000
Total ........................................................ $45,000
The above calculation shows that C is entitled to a supplemental elective-share amount of
$5,000 ($50,000 minus $45,000). The supplemental elective-share amount is payable
entirely from B's net probate estate.
The end result is that C is entitled to $40,000 ($35,000 + $5,000) by way of elective share
from B's net probate estate (and nonprobate transfers to others, had there been any).
Forty thousand dollars is the amount necessary to bring C's $10,000 in assets up to
$50,000. See UNIF. PROB. CODE, Art. II, Pt. 2 Gen. cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
114. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03.1-06 (1991); id. § 30.1-05-04 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1,
1996); id. § 30.1-05-07 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
115. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-05-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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IV. HOMESTEAD, FAMILY ALLOWANCE, AND EXEMPT
PROPERTY
In addition to the elective share or the supplemental elective share,
the surviving spouse is also entitled to homestead estate, family allow-
ance, and exempt property. Minor children may also be recipients of
these family benefits.
In North Dakota, the homestead estate is available only to the
surviving spouse or minor children if the decedent had title to real
property which constituted a homestead."l 6 The surviving spouse is
entitled to the homestead estate for life or until he or she marries again;
if there is no surviving spouse, the decedent's minor children may
receive the homestead estate until the youngest attains majority."i7 The
real property constituting the homestead may descend or be distributed
to the surviving spouse and decedent's heirs in the direct descending line
even though all decedent's debts are not fully paid."i8 The U.P.C., on
the other hand, proposes a flat award of $15,000 homestead allowance to
each surviving spouse or, if none, to each minor child and each depen-
dent child of the decedent, divided by the number of minor and depen-
dent children of the decedent.119
The revised law increases the family allowance from $6,000 to
$18,000 which may be disbursed in periodic payments not exceeding
$1,500 per month for one year.120 The family allowance is payable to
the decedent's surviving spouse and minor children whom the decedent
was obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported
by the decedent.121
With respect to exempt property, the, revised law increases the
allowance to the surviving spouse from $5,000 to $10,000.122 If there is
no surviving spouse, the decedent's minor children and children who
were in fact being supported by the decedent are entitled jointly to the
$10,000 exempt property allowance.123 The prior law allowed all the
116. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1976). The homestead consists of the land upon which the
decedent resided, and the dwelling house on that land in.which the decedent resided, with all its
appurtenances, and all other improvements on the land, provided that the total does not exceed
$80.000 in value, over and above liens or encumbrances or both. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (1978
& Supp. 1995).
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1976).
118. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-04 (Supp. 1995) (effective Aug. 1. 1995).
119. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-402 (1990) (amended 1993).
120. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-07-03(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
121. Id. § 30.1-07-02(1).
122. Id. § 30.1-07-01.
123. Id.
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decedent's children, both minor and adult, to select exempt property if
there was no surviving spouse.124
V. WILLS
The revised law makes no major changes in the chapter on wills but
there are revisions, especially in the following areas: 1) revocation and
revival of wills; 2) separate documents disposing of items of tangible
property; and 3) testamentary additions to trusts. Furthermore, the
chapter dealing with the spouse and children who are not provided for in
wills is substantially revised.
A major change proposed by the U.P.C. that was not adopted in
North Dakota is the adoption of a "dispensing power" statute that
allows a court to excuse a harmless error in complying with the formal
requirements for executing or revoking a will.125 The U.P.C. proposed
the change as part of its approach to unify the law of probate and
nonprobate transfers.1 26 The dispensing power law or doctrine of
substantial compliance or principle of harmless error, has long been
applied to sustain nonprobate transfers despite defective compliance with
the formal requirements for nonprobate transfers.127 The U.P.C. dis-
pensing power provision would mean, for example, that if a person
misunderstood the formal requirements for executing a will and had
only one witness sign the will, a court could uphold the will if the propo-
nent of the writing established by clear and convincing evidence that the
person intended the document to be his or her will.128 Such a provision
could also allow a court to honor a lay person's intent to revoke and re-
execute a will in those types of situations where the person blackens out
one name in a devise on a will and replaces it with another name.129 To
give some relief in the latter type of situations, American courts rely on
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. 130
124. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-07-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
125. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990) (amended 1993). Manitoba, Canada has adopted the
doctrine of substantial compliance that allows a court, if it is satisfied that a document embodies the
testamentary intentions of a deceased to uphold that document as a will, notwithstanding that the
document was not executed according to the requirements of the wills act. R.S.M., Wills Act, Section
23 (1983). The substantial compliance doctrine can also be utilized in cases of revocation or revival
of wills. Id. Montana has adopted the U.P.C. dispensing power statute. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523
(1995).
126. UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II (Prefatory Note, Revisions) (1990) (amended 1993).
127. Id. § 2-503.
128. Id.
129. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996) (stating the
formalities which must be followed in order to execute a valid attested or holographic will).
130. WILLIAM M. McGovERN JR. ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES, INCLUDING TAXATION &
FUTURE INTERESTS 217 (1988).
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In the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers),131 the
American Law Institute encourages courts to permit the probate of wills
that substantially comply with the formalities of the statute of wills.
Some courts have adopted the doctrine of substantial compliance.132 In
In Re Alleged Will of Ranney,133 the testator signed his will but both
witnesses instead of signing the will, signed the self-proving affidavit
which was at the end of the document.1 34 These signatures did not
conform to the requirements of the statute of wills.135 The court applied
the doctrine of substantial compliance and remanded the case to the trial
court with the instructions that "if . . . the [court] is satisfied that the
execution of the will substantially complied with the statutory require-
ments, it may reinstate the judgment of the Surrogate admitting the will
to probate."1 36 The court said: "It would be ironic to insist on literal
compliance with statutory formalities when that insistence would invali-
date a will that is the deliberate and voluntary act of the testator. Such a
result would frustrate rather than further the purpose of the formali-
ties."137 The revised North Dakota law added a provision to the statute
setting forth the form of the self-proved affidavit to the effect that "a
signature affixed to [this] affidavit attached to a will is considered a
signature affixed to the will, if necessary to prove the will's due execu-
tion."138 Recently, in Matter of Estate of Voeller,139 the Supreme Court
of North Dakota had an opportunity to apply the doctrine of substantial
compliance.140 In Voeller, two persons were present when the testator
executed a codicil to his will but only one witness signed the codicil.141
The court pointed out that the statute of wills clearly stated that a will
"shall be signed by at least two persons."142 Referring to a U.P.C.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 33.1 cmt. g. (1990) (discussing donative transfers).
132. In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1343 (NJ. 1991). See, e.g., In re LaMont's
Estate, 248 P.2d 1, 2-3 (Cal. 1952) (finding that the signature of witness substantially complied with
execution requirements even if witness thought he was signing as executor).
133. 589 A.2d 1339 (NJ. 1991).
134. In re Alleged Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1339 (N.J. 1991).
135. Id. at 1343.
136. Id. at 1346.
137. Id. at 1344.
138. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-04(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
139. 534 N.W.2d 24 (N.D. 1995).
140. In re Estate of Voeller, 534 N.W.2d 24, 24-25 (N.D. 1995).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 26. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
The pertinent section of the new anti-lapse section is as follows:
1. In this section:
a. "Alternative beneficiary designation" means a beneficiary designation that is
expressly created by the governing instrument and, under the terms of the governing instrument, can
take effect instead of another beneficiary designation on the happening of one or more events,
including survival of the decedent or failure to survive the decedent, whether an event is expressed in
condition-precedent, condition-subsequent, or any other form.
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b. "Beneficiary" means the beneficiary designation under which the beneficiary must
survive the decedent, and includes a class member if the beneficiary designation is in the form of a
class gift and includes an individual or class member who was deceased at the time the beneficiary
designation was executed as well as an individual or class member who was then living but who failed
to survive the decedent, but excludes a joint tenant of a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship and
a party to a joint and survivorship account.
c. "Beneficiary designation" includes an alternative beneficiary designation and a
beneficiary designation in the form of a class gift.
d. "Class member" includes an individual who fails to survive the decedent but who would
have taken under a beneficiary designation in the form of a class gift had the individual survived the
decedent.
e. "Stepchild" means a child of the decedent's surviving, deceased, or former spouse, and
not of the decedent.
f. "Survivorship beneficiary" or "surviving descendant" means a beneficiary or a
descendant who neither predeceased the decedent nor is deemed to have predeceased the decedent
under section 30.1-09.1-02.
2. If a beneficiary fails to survive the decedent and is a grandparent, a descendant of a
grandparent, or a stepchild of the decedent, the following apply:
a. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the beneficiary designation is not in the form of a
class gift and the deceased beneficiary leaves surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the
beneficiary's surviving descendants. They take by representation the property to which the
beneficiary would have been entitled had the beneficiary survived the decedent.
b. Except as provided in subdivision d, if the beneficiary designation is in the form of a
class gift, other than a beneficiary designation to "issue," "descendants," "heirs of the body," "heirs,"
"next of kin," "relatives," "family," or a class described by language of similar import, a substitute gift
is created in the surviving descendants of any deceased beneficiary. The property to which the
beneficiaries would have been entitled had all of them survived the decedent passes to the surviving
beneficiaries and the surviving descendants of the deceased beneficiaries. Each surviving beneficia-
ry takes the share to which the surviving beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased
beneficiaries survived the decedent. Each deceased beneficiary's surviving decedents who are
substituted for the deceased beneficiary take by representation the share to which the deceased
beneficiary would have been entitled had the deceased beneficiary survived the decedent. For the
purpose of this subdivision, "deceased beneficiary" means a class member who failed to survive the
decedent and left one or more surviving descendants.
c. For purposes of section 30.1-09.1-01, words of survivorship, such as in a beneficiary
designation to an individual "if the individual survives me," or in a beneficiary designation to "my
surviving children," are not, in the absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indication of an intent
contrary to the application of this section.
d. If a governing instrument creates an alternative beneficiary designation with respect to
a beneficiary designation for which a substitute gift is created by subdivision a or b, the designated
beneficiary of the alternative beneficiary designation is entitled to take.
3. If, under subsection 2, substitute gifts are created and not superseded with respect to more
than one beneficiary designation, and the beneficiary designations are alternative beneficiary
designations, one to the other, the determination of which substitute gift takes effect is resolved as
follows:
a. Except as provided in subdivision b. the property passes under the primary substitute gift.
b. If there is a younger-generation beneficiary designation, the property passes under the
younger-generation substitute gift and not under the primary substitute gift.
c. In this subsection:
(1) "Primary beneficiary designation" means the beneficiary designation that
would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries of the alternative beneficiary designations
who left surviving descendants survived the decedent.
(2) "Primary substitute gift" means the substitute gift created with respect to the
primary beneficiary designation.
(3) "Younger generation beneficiary designation" means a beneficiary
designation that is to a descendant of a beneficiary of the primary beneficiary designation, is an
alternative beneficiary designation with respect to the primary beneficiary designation, is a beneficia-
ry designation for which a substitute gift is created, and would have taken effect had all the deceased
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comment, the court noted that this statute represented the minimum
requirements for the execution of will. The court stated: "[T]he signa-
ture of a single witness does not meet the 'minimum formalities.' We
decline to accept 'substantial compliance' because it would decrease the
'minimum' formalities for a valid testamentary act."143
With regard to the revocation of wills, the revised law provides
additional assistance in determining the legality of the physical act of
revocation and in interpreting whether in a given case a subsequent will
with no revocatory clause revokes a prior will by inconsistency. Under
both the revised law and prior law, a will may be revoked by the physical
acts of burning, tearing, canceling, obliterating, or destroying.144 The
revised law adds that "a burning, tearing, or canceling is a revocatory act
on the will, whether or not the burn, tear, or cancellation touch any of the
words on the will."145 This revised provision reverses judicial decisions
holding that cancellation is not valid unless the canceling words, marks
or lines physically come in contact with some part of the written words
on the will. 146
On the question of inconsistent provisions in wills, the revised law
sets forth a standard to determine whether the subsequent will containing
no revocatory clause was meant to supplement or revoke a prior will.
The standard is that if a subsequent will does not expressly revoke a
previous will, it will revoke a prior will by inconsistency if the testator
intended the subsequent will to replace rather than supplement the
will. 147 In determining the intention of a testator, two presumptions can
be utilized. One presumption is that the testator intended to have a
subsequent will replace rather than supplement a previous will if the
subsequent will makes a complete disposition of the testator's estate. 148
beneficiaries who left surviving descendants survived the decedent except the deceased beneficiary
or beneficiaries of the primary beneficiary designation.
(4) "Younger-generation substitute gift" means the substitute gift created with
respect to the younger-generation beneficiary designation.
143. Voeller, 534 N.W.2d at 26. The court would not apply an equitable remedy as requested by
the personal representative who argued that the deceased had indisputedly signed the 1988 codicil and
intended it to be effective. The personal representative argued that the only purpose of having
witnesses to the will or codicil is to make certain that the testator actually signed the will or codicil.
The court stated: "(B]ut an equitable remedy cannot avoid the meaning of an unambiguous statute ...
When all the wording of the statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." Id.
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); id. §
30.1-08-07(1)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
145. ND. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(l)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
146. See, e.g., Thompson v. Royall, 175 S.E. 748, 750 (Va. 1934) (stating that for proper
cancellation, there must be marks or lines across the writing of the instrument).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
148. Id. § 30.1-08-07(3).
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Like most presumptions, this presumption can be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence. 149  If it is not rebutted, the prior will is revoked
and only the subsequent will is operative on the testator's death.150 This
means that even if the subsequent will fails for some reason, the prior will
is considered revoked and has no legal significance.151 However, if this
presumption is rebutted, then the prior will is merely superseded. If the
testator dies with the subsequent will still intact, this subsequent will
controls and will distribute the testator's property; the superseded will is
of no effect. But if in the case of a merely superseded prior will, the
subsequent will fails for some reason, like being physically revoked, then
the superseded prior will is automatically reinstated if possible under the
circumstances. The second presumption is that "[t]he testator . . .
intended a subsequent will to supplement rather than replace a previous
will if the subsequent will does not make a complete disposition of the
testator's estate." 152 Again, this presumption can be rebutted by clear
and convincing evidence.153 If it is not rebutted, "the subsequent will
revokes the previous will only to the extent the subsequent will is incon-
sistent with the previous will" and "each will is fully operative on the
testator's death to the extent they are not inconsistent." 154 If the subse-
quent will fails or is revoked in its entirety, then the prior will disposes of
testator's property.155 Likewise, if this second presumption is rebutted,
then the prior will is revoked and only the subsequent will is operative on
the testator's death. 156
Regarding the revival of revoked wills, the prior law did not distin-
guish between the partial and complete revocation of a will in a case
where a subsequent will revoked a prior will and was then itself revoked
by a physical act.157 The revised law makes such a distinction and
proposes two standards to determine whether the prior will is revived.
First, in the case of a subsequent will that wholly revoked a previous will
and then that subsequent will itself is revoked by a physical act, the
presumption is that the previous will remains revoked and is not re-
vived.158 The presumption can be rebutted if the proponent of the
previous will can establish that it is evident from the circumstances of the
revocation of the subsequent will or from the testator's contemporary
149. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-507 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
150. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(3).
151. Id.
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-07(4).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. § 30.1-08-07(3).
156. Id.
157. NJ). CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-09 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
158. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-09(I) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1. 1996).
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declarations at the time of revocation or subsequently, that the testator
intended the previous will to be revived to take effect as executed. 159
Second, in the case of a subsequent will that partly revoked a previous
will and then that subsequent will itself is revoked by a physical act, the
presumption is that a revoked part of the previous will is revived.160
Again the presumption can be rebutted, if the proponent of the previous
will can show that it is evident that the testator did not intend the revoked
part to take effect as executed. 16 1 Testimony of the testator's statements
made at the time of the revocation of the subsequent will or later, as well
as evidence of the circumstances of the revocation of the subsequent will
can be admitted to show testator's intent that the revoked part of the
previous will be revived.162
The revised law retains the prior law's revival doctrine in the event
that a subsequent will (Will #2) that revoked a previous will (Will #1), in
whole or part, is itself revoked by another, later, will (Will #3). In this
type of situation, the previous will (Will #1) remains revoked in whole or
in part, unless it appears from the terms of the later will (Will #3) that the
testator intended that the previous will (Will #1) or its revoked part, to
take effect and thereby be revived.163
Regarding separate testamentary writings, the revised law made
some changes in the method by which persons can devise "items of
tangible personal property, not otherwise specifically disposed of by the
will, other than money," without following the requirements of the
statute of wills for attested or holographic wills.164 In order to be able to
dispose of this type of property in a written statement or list, the testator
must refer to such a document in the will.165 The Comment to this
U.P.C. provision provides a sample clause:
I might leave a written statement or list disposing of items of
personal property. If I do and if my written statement or list is
found and is identified as such by my Personal Representative
no later than 30 days after the probate of this will, then my
159. Id.
160. Id. § 30.1-08-09(2).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-09(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). The revised law
dropped the confusing language in the prior law that followed the words "other than money." Id. §
30.1-08-13. The prior law stated that the written statement or list could dispose of "items of tangible
personal property not otherwise specifically disposed of by the will, other than money, evidences of
indebtedness, documents of title, and securities and property used in trade or business." N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-08-13 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996). Evidences of indebtedness, documents
of title, securities and property used in trade and business were not tangible personal property. Id.
164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-13 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
165. Id.
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written statement or list is to be given effect to the extent
authorized by law and is to take precedence over any contrary
devise or devises of the same item or items of property in this
will.166
The sample clause states that the items on the list are to take prece-
dence over any specifically devised property; if this statement with
regard to such preference was not stated in the will, then the specifically
devised property in the will would take precedence over any devises of
the same property made in the subsequent lists. The prior law required
that these lists or statements be signed by the testator or be in the hand-
writing of the testator. 167 The revised la'w requires that all such lists and
statements be signed by the testator to avoid mere planning sheets or
drafts from becoming valid.168 The Comment to the U.P.C. for this
provision points out that a list or statement of this nature does not have
to itemize individual tangible personal property but could dispose of all
such property in a document referring to "all my tangible personal
property other than money" or to "all my tangible personal property
located in my home."169
With regard to testamentary additions to trusts, the revised law
clarifies one section and revises other sections giving the decedent more
alternatives. 170 This statute basically deals with a devise pouring proper-
ty over from a will to a trust. The prior law allowed a devise in a will to
pour over to a trust "established or to be established by the testator;"
the revised law specifically states that the devise can also pour over to a
trust established "at the testator's death by the testator's devise to the
trustee."1 71 Other changes in the revised law include: 1) allowing the
trust terms that are to be set forth in a written instrument other than a will
to be executed not only before or concurrently with the execution of the
testator's will, as stated in the prior law, but also after the execution of
the testator's will; 2) allowing the trust to be administered according to
terms which include amendments made not only before the testator's
death, as stated in the prior law, but also after the testator's death; and 3)
allowing the decedent's will to provide that a revocation or termination
of the trust before the decedent's death will not cause the devise to lapse,
an alternative not available under the prior law. 172
166. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-513 (1990) (amended 1993).
167. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-13 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-13 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996); UNI. PROB. CODE §
2-513 (1990) (amended 1993).
169. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-513.
170. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-11 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1. 1996).
171. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-11 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
172. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-11 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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With regard to the execution of a will or the revocation of a will by
a physical act, the testator need not sign the document or perform the act
but may direct another person to sign for him or her or to revoke the
document by an act. The revised law stipulates that if another person
signs for the testator or revokes the will by an act, that person must do it
in the testator's conscious presence.173 The prior law did not mention a
test but merely stated "in the testator's presence." 174 The revised law
adopts the conscious presence test, thereby rejecting the scope of vision
test. 175
A. SPOUSE AND CHILDREN UNPROVIDED FOR IN WILLS
The two laws protecting the spouse and children who have been
unprovided for in a premarital will have been revised-one law deals
with a surviving spouse who married the testator after the testator execut-
ed the will, and the other law deals with a testator's children who were
adopted or born after the testator executed the will. 176 Both revised laws
reflect a desire to give more effect to the intention of the decedent with
regard to his or her testamentary plan for his or her children than was
given under the prior law.
Under prior law, the omitted spouse could receive an intestate share
unless: 1) it appeared from the will that the omission was intentional; or
2) the testator provided for the spouse by a transfer outside the will and
the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown
by statements of the testator or from the amount of the transfer or other
evidence.1 77 Under the revised law, the surviving spouse need no longer
be an omitted spouse. As long as the surviving spouse received less in a
premarital will than he or she would have received if the testator had died
intestate, the surviving spouse is entitled to an additional amount to make
up the full intestate share.178 In other words, if the spouse's intestate
share is $100,000 and the spouse was given a $50,000 general devise in a
premarital will, the spouse would be entitled to receive only another
$50,000. The spouse receives $50,000 under the will, plus an additional
$50,000 for a total of $100,000, the intestate share. Under the revised
law, the surviving spouse is still entitled to an intestate share but within
certain limits. The surviving spouse's intestate share cannot be taken
either from that portion of the testator's estate that is devised to a child
173. Id. §§ 30.1-08-02(1)(b), -07(1).
174. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30,1-08-02, -07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
175. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-08-02(1)(b), -07(2)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
176. Id. §§ 30.1-06-01, -02.
177. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
178. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-01(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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of the testator who was born before the testator married the surviving
spouse and who is not a child of the surviving spouse, nor from that
portion of the testator's estate that is devised to a descendant of such a
child or passes under the anti-lapse statute to such child, or to a descen-
dant of such child.179 The surviving spouse is entitled to have an intes-
tate share satisfied from that portion of decedent's estate that is not
devised to these specified children or descendants.SO Finally, even if the
surviving spouse qualifies to take an intestate share, the surviving spouse
is barred from taking under the revised law if:
a. It appears from the will or other evidence that the will was
made in contemplation of the testator's marriage to the surviv-
ing spouse;
b. The will expresses the intention that it is to be effective
notwithstanding any subsequent marriage; or
c. The testator provided for the spouse by transfer outside the
will and the intent that the transfer be in lieu of a testamentary
provision is shown by the testator's statements or is reasonably
inferred from the amount of the transfer, or by other evi-
dence.181
Thus, whereas the prior law called for all devises in the will to be
abated in order to provide for the omitted spouse's intestate share, the
revised law satisfies the surviving spouse's intestate share by first apply-
ing any devises in the will made to the spouse and then abating other
devises other than those made to the specified children and their descen-
dants who may take in their own right or by virtue of the anti-lapse
statutes. 182
Regarding the protection of a testator's children who are born or
adopted after the testator has executed a will, the revised law makes
substantial changes. Under prior law, an after-born or after-adopted
child, if qualified to take, was entitled to his or her intestate share, and
other devises in the will were abated to satisfy that share.' 8 3 Under the
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. § 30.1-06-01(1)(a), (b), (c).
182. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-01(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-06-01(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
183. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996). Such child did
not qualify to take an intestate share if:
a) [i]t appears from the will that the omission was intentional;
b) [wihen the will was executed the testator had one or more children and devised
substantially all his [or her] estate to the other parent of the omitted child; or
c) [tihe testator provided for the child by transfer outside the will and the intent that the
transfer be in lieu of a testamentary provision is shown by statements of the testator or
from the amount of the transfer or other evidence.
19961
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
revised law, such omitted child is entitled to his or her intestate share
only if the testator had no child living when the testator executed the will
and only if the will did not devise all or substantially all of the estate to
the other parent of the omitted child and the other parent survived the
testator and is entitled to take under the will.184  The revised statute
presents a formula for determining the share of an omitted child if the
testator had one or more children living when the testator executed the
will.185 First, the omitted after-born or after-adopted child is limited to
the amount devised in the will to the testator's then living children.' 8 6
Second, this devised amount is divided equally by the number of all
omitted after-born and after-adopted children and all the children who
received devises under the will.187 Each omitted after-born or
after-adopted child receives this equal share. Third, this share should be
of the same character, whether equitable or legal, present or future, as
that devised to the testator's then-living children in the will. 188 Fourth, to
satisfy the omitted child's share, the devises to the testator's children
who were living when the will was executed abate ratably in accordance
with the character of the testamentary plan.189
A testator can take steps to prevent a future after-born and after-
adopted child from taking a share under this law. Similar to prior law,
the revised law states that an omitted child could not qualify to take a
share if it appears from the will that the omission was intentional or a
transfer was made in lieu of a testamentary provision as shown by the
testator's statements or is reasonably inferred from the amount of the
transfer or other evidence. 190
Both the revised and prior laws provide for a living child who
received nothing in his or her parent's will only because the parent
believes that child to be dead. Under the prior law, that child receives his
or her intestate share; under the revised law that child is entitled to share
Id.
184. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-01(i)(a) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). If the omitted
child could take the intestate share, the other devises in the will would be abated to satisfy the share
pursuant to the rules for abatement under section 30.1-20-02. Id. § 30.1-06-02(4).




189. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). For example.
testator had a son and daughter at the time of the execution of her will and devised the son, $10,000
and the daughter, $5,000. Subsequently, she had another daughter. The second daughter, an omitted
after-born child, would take $5,000, an equal share of the amount of $15,000 which was devised to the
then-living children. The remaining $10,000 would be divided ratably between the son and the first
daughter. Since the son was to have received twice the sum as the first daughter the ratio is 2:1. Thus,
the son will get two-thirds of the remaining $10,000 or $6,667 and the first daughter will get one-third
of the remaining $10,000 or $3,333. For another formula for computing the pro rata reduction, see
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-302 (1990) (amended 1993).
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02(2).
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in the estate as if the child were an omitted after-born or after-adopted
child.191 According to both laws, these shares are satisfied according to
the rules for abatement. 192
VI. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
The revised law makes minor changes in its chapter on rules of
construction dealing with wills but has added a chapter dealing with
governing instruments. 193 This added chapter reflects the recognition
that individuals today dispose of great amounts of wealth through
nonprobate devices both during their lifetimes and at death. The move-
ment today is in the direction of unifying the law of probate and
nonprobate devices. 194 For example, the lapse statute which formerly
was designed to save certain devises that failed in wills is now being used
to save gifts being made to certain persons who are beneficiaries of
insurance policies and pensions but who die before the insured or the
person entitled to the pension.195 Also, prior law has stipulated that for
a devisee to take under a will he or she must survive the testator by 120
hours.196 Under the revised law that same requirement, unless the
governing instrument states otherwise, is applicable to governing instru-
ments such as trusts. 197 The major areas covered by this revised law
applicable to governing instruments include: A revised simultaneous
death act, an anti-lapse statute, presumptions governing the exercise of a
power of appointment, rules of construction of class gifts, and future
interests especially future interests in trusts. Not all nonprobate devices
are included under these rules, but only those included in the law's
definition of "governing instrument."1 98
Statutes in both sections dealing with rules of construction stipulate
that the intention of the creator of the governing instrument controls and
only when the creator's intention cannot be ascertained, do these rules of
191. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1. 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-06-02(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
192. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-06-02(4) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
193. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-09-01 to -13, 30.1-09.1-01 to -11 (Supp. 1995 ) (effective Jan. 1,
1996).
194. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1108,1109 (1984).
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06.
196. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-01 (Supp. 1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1996).
197. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1,1996).
198. The devices included in the term "governing instrument" are "a deed, will, trust, insurance
or annuity policy, account with payable on death designation. security registered in beneficiary form
transferable on death, pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, instrument creating
or exercising a power of appointment or a power of attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or
nominative instrument of any similar type." Id. § 30.1-01-06(20).
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construction apply. 199 In a sense these rules are presumptions that can
be rebutted. They can be helpful both in interpreting wills and other
governing instruments and in drafting such instruments.
A. THE REVISED SIMULTANEOUS DEATH STATUTE
The North Dakota Uniform Simultaneous Death Act has been
repealed and replaced with a section in the chapter on rules of construc-
tion for governing instruments. 2 00 The Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act only addressed situations in which it was impossible to determine
who died first. 20 1 For all practical purposes this new section is the new
simultaneous death act except that it goes further than the former Act.
The revised law imposes the 120 hour requirement of survival on per-
sons involved in situations which otherwise would be covered by the
former Act as well as in situations which would not be covered by the
former Act because it could be determined who died first. 20 2 Even
though one person survives another, the revised law requires them also to
survive the decedent by 120 hours.20 3
A separate statute in another chapter of the probate code deals with
heirs who fail to survive their intestate deceased by the 120 hours. The
statute states any individual who failes to survive the decedent by 120
hours is deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of
homestead, exempt property, and intestate succession. 204 Further, if it is
not established by clear and convincing evidence that an individual, who
would otherwise take under the intestate succession laws, survived the
decedent by 120 hours, that individual is deemed to have failed to
survive for the required period. 20 5 This statute is not to be applied if its
application would result in an escheat to the state.206
The revised law, which can be viewed as an improved simultaneous
death act, applies to governing instruments and to all situations which
arise under the probate code. This law states that an individual who is
not established by clear and convincing evidence to have survived an
event, including the death of another individual, by 120 hours is deemed
199. N.D. CErNT. CODE §§ 30.1-09.1-03, -01 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1,1996).
200. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-12-01 to -06 (Supp. 1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1996): N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
201. N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-12-01 (Supp. 1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1996).
202. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-02(1), (2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
203. Id.
204. Id. § 30.1-04-04.
205. Id.
206. Id. This slightly revised statute is not included under the sections for rules of construction,
because no contrary intention, written or declared by a person who died intestate, can reverse its
operation: An heir who did not survive the decedent by the 120 hours is deemed to have predeceased
the decedent. Id.
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to have predeceased the event. 207 One example, would be a devisee who
does not survive the testator by 120 hours. Another example would be
the case of a co-owner of property with a right of survivorship who fails
to survive the death of another co-owner. The revised law states that if it
is not established by clear and convincing evidence that one of two
co-owners survived the other co-owner by 120 hours, one-half of the
property passes as if one had survived by 120 hours, and one-half as if
the other had survived by 120 hours. 208 If there are more than two
co-owners and it is not established by clear and convincing evidence that
at least one of them survived the others by 120 hours, the property
passes in the proportion that one bears to the whole number of
co-owners .209
There are four circumstances under which survival by 120 hours is
not required. First, the governing language may address the problem,
for example, by saying in a will that a devisee must survive the decedent
by 30 days in order to take the devise. More particularly, not only must
there be language in the instrument that deals explicitly with simulta-
neous deaths or deaths in a common disaster, but that language must also
be operable under the facts of the case. 2 10 Second, a person may in a
governing instrument expressly state either that an individual is not
required to.survive an event, including the death of another individual by
any specified period or that an individual is required to survive the event
by a specified period. 211 For example, it is possible to have a person
take under the governing instrument as long as that person survives the
creator of the instrument even if that person only survives the creator by
one minute. However, survival of the stated event or the stated specified
period must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 212 Third,
survival by the 120 hours is not required if the imposition of the require-
ment would cause a nonvested property interest or a power of appoint-
ment to fail as a violation of the rule against perpetuities. 213 Survival of
the creator of the governing interest must nonetheless be proved by clear
and convincing evidence. Fourth, when the application of the 120-hour
requirement to multiple governing instruments would result in an
unintended failure or duplication of a disposition, then survival by the
207. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-02 (1), (2). (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
208. Id. § 30.1-09.1-02(3).
209. Id. "[T]he term "co-owners with right of survivorship' [in this context] includes joint
tenants, tenants by the entireties, and other co-owners of property or accounts held under
circumstances that entitles one or more to the whole of the property or account on the death of the
other or others." Id.
210. Id. § 30.1-09-02(4)(a).
211. Id. § 30.1-09.1-02(4)(b).
212. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-02(4)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
213. Id. § 30.1-09.1-02(4)(c).
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120 hours is not required. 214 For example, if survival by 120 hours is
required in a case in which a husband and wife each in their respective
wills left $50,000 to Charity A and then subsequently died in a common
disaster with the wife surviving the husband by only 48 hours, their
respective estates would be administrated as if each had predeceased the
other with Charity A receiving two separate $50,000 gifts. The fourth
exception to the imposition of the 120-hour requirement is designed to
prevent this duplication of gifts and thus only the $50,000 charitable
devise in the wife's will is effective.215
B. THE LAPSE STATUTES
There are two anti-lapse statutes, one dealing with wills and the other
dealing with governing instruments. The U.P.C. proposed a comprehen-
sive solution to lapse problems and applied it not only to wills as was
done in the pre-1990 U.P.C., but also in a new section to governing
instruments. 2 16 This new section addresses a number of problems that
have arisen in recent years and were not addressed or answerable under
the pre-1990 U.P.C. anti-lapse statutes. The North Dakota Legislature
retained the anti-lapse statutes based on the pre-1990 Code, but adopted
the U.P.C.'s new anti-lapse statute for governing instruments. 217 The
legislature also adopted a new statute dealing with future interests under
the terms of a trust.218
The anti-lapse statute for wills saves a devise for descendants of a
deceased devisee who fails to survive the testator provided that the
deceased devisee is a grandparent or lineal descendant of a grandparent
of the testator.219 These descendants have to survive the testator by 120
hours.220 This statute also applies to class gifts.22 1 If an anti-lapse statute
214. Id. § 30.1-09.1-(4)(d).
215. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-702 (1990) (amended 1993).
216. Id. §§ 2-603,-604,-705.
217. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 30.1-09-05, -06, 30.1-09.1-06 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
218. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07.
219. Id. § 30.1-09-05. This law states:
If a devisee who is a grandparent or a lineal descendant of a grandparent of the testator
is dead at the time of execution of the will, fails to survive the testator, or is treated as if
the devisee predeceased the testator, the issue of the deceased devisee who survive the
testator by one hundred twenty hours take in place of the deceased devisee and if they
are all of the same degree of kinship to the devisee they take equally, but if of unequal
degree, then those of more remote degree take by representation. One who would have
been a devisee under a class gift if that person had survived the testator is treated as a
devisee for purposes of this section where that person's death occurred before or after
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fails to save the devise, it fails and becomes part of the residuary. 222 If
the residue is devised to two or more persons, the share of a residuary
devisee that fails for any reason passes to the other residuary devisee or
devisees in proportion to the interests of each in the remaining part of
the residue. 223
Although the new anti-lapse statute applicable to governing instru-
ments presents a different conceptual framework, it nonetheless provides
the same basic protection for descendants of a deceased beneficiary who
fails to survive the decedent. 224 One difference is that the deceased
beneficiary may also be a stepchild as well as a grandparent or lineal
descendant of a grandparent of the testator.225 Another difference is that
the new law applies the anti-lapse protection only to class gifts that are
single generational, such as children, grandchildren, brothers, sisters, and
the like, and not to multigenerational class gifts, such as issue, descen-
dants, heirs, relatives, family, and language of similar import. 226
An example of how this new anti-lapse statute would apply to an
insurance policy is as follows: If a beneficiary of an insurance policy
dies before the insured, the proceeds of the policy, which does not name
an alternative beneficiary, will ordinarily go to the insured's estate. The
new anti-lapse statute will save the gift to that beneficiary for the benefi-
ciary's surviving descendants if the beneficiary is a grandparent, a
descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild of the deceased beneficia-
ry. 227 The surviving descendants of this substitute gift take by represen-
tation the proceeds of the policy to which the beneficiary would have
been entitled had the beneficiary survived the decedent. 228 This same
law applies if the proceeds of the insurance policy were payable to a
group of beneficiaries in the form of a class gift, other than a beneficiary
designation to "issue," "descendants," "heirs of the body," "heirs,"
"next of kin," "relatives," "family," or a class described by language
of similar import. 229 The proceeds to which the beneficiaries would have
222. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-06(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
223. Id. § 30.1-09-06(2).
224. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(2). This statute states:
If the beneficiary designation is not in the form of a class gift and the deceased
beneficiary leaves surviving descendants, a substitute gift is created in the beneficiary's
surviving descendants. .... [Ihf the beneficiary designation is in the form of a class gift,
other than a beneficiary designation to "issue", "descendants", "heirs of the body" ... or
a class described by language of similar import, a substitute gift is created in the
surviving descendants of any deceased beneficiary.
Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(2)(a), (b).
225. Id.
226. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(2)(b).
227. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06(2)ta) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
228. Id.
229. Id. § 30.1-09-06(2)(b).
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been entitled, had all of them survived the decedent passes to the surviv-
ing beneficiaries and the surviving descendants of deceased beneficia-
ries. The latter group takes the substitute gift by representation.230
The system of representation to be used under this statute is the
same as that applied in the intestate succession law.231 Although the law
is set forth as applied in the case of an insurance policy, this law is
applicable to all governing instruments in which a beneficiary fails to
survive a decedent. This law is an example of the trend to unify the law
of probate and nonprobate devices. In this instance, the law applies to
certain nonprobate instruments, an anti-lapse protection which was
traditionally confined to the law of wills.
Another area of concern that the new anti-lapse statute addresses is
what precise language should be used to prevent the application of an
anti-lapse provision. Some recent decisions suggest that certain words of
survivorship do not automatically mean that the anti-lapse statute will not
apply. 232 In a Minnesota case, In re Estate of Ulrikson 233 a testator left
her residuary estate to her brother and sister to, "share and share alike,
and in the event that either one of them shall predecease me, then to the
other surviving brother and sister."234 Both the brother and sister
predeceased the testator with only the brother leaving descendants who
survived the testator. 235 The court construed the words of survivorship
to be effective only if there were survivors, that is, if the brother survived
the sister, or vice-versa. 236 The court observed that: "Since there were
no survivors in this case, the anti-lapse statute is free to operate." 237 The
court applied the anti-lapse statute and allowed the residuary estate to
pass to the brother's descendants. 238
The traditional approach to defeat the anti-lapse statute has been to
use words of survivorship. For example, a devise "to my brother, if he
survives me" or "to my surviving nephews" was interpreted to mean
that only those who in fact survive take the gift and if they do not
survive, their gifts lapse and pass by residuary clauses, if any, but surely
do not go to their surviving descendants. The new anti-lapse statute
states that such words of survivorship in governing instruments are not,
230. id.
231. The term "beneficiary" excludes a joint tenant of a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship and a party to a joint and survivorship account. Id. § 30.1-09-06(1)(b). See id. §
30.1-01-06.
232. 8 U.L.A. 2603 (1983) (Supp. 1995) (containing the 1990 U.P.C. with 1993 amendments).
233. 290 N.W.2d. 757 (Minn. 1980).
234. In re Estate of Ulrikson, 290 N.W. 2d 757, 758-59 (Minn. 1980).
235. Id. at 758.
236. Id. at 759.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 760.
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in the absence of additional evidence, a sufficient indication of intent
that the anti-lapse statutes should not be applicable. 239 To defeat the
anti-lapse statute's application, an insurance policy designating a benefi-
ciary should probably state something such as "to my beneficiary, A,
but not to A's descendants."
The anti-lapse law with regard to wills does not address this concern.
Nonetheless, it may be helpful to use some of the "foolproof' means of
expressing an intention that the anti-lapse statute should not apply as set
forth by the U.P.C. in its comment dealing with wills. 240 These "fool-
proof' means include:. 1) adding to a devise the phrase "and not to [the
devisee's] descendants;" 2) adding in a power of appointment instru-
ment the phrase "and not to an appointee's descendants;" 3) adding to
the residuary clause the phrase "including all lapsed or failed devises;"
4) adding to a nonresiduary devise the phrase "if the devisee does not
survive me, the devise is to pass under the residuary clause;" and 5)
adding to a will a separate clause stating "if the devisee of any
nonresiduary devise does not survive me, the devise is to pass under the
residuary clause."241
The new anti-lapse statute dealing with governing instruments uses
some technical terminology in a number of different scenarios. 24 2
Scenario #1: An insurance policy of an insured who has died is payable
"to A if she survives me; if not to B." A and B are nieces of the in-
sured. A, the beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, predeceases the
insured and leaves descendants who survived the insured. The new law
refers to B as the beneficiary of an alternative beneficiary designation
and provides that B rather than the descendants of A is entitled to take
the proceeds of the policy. The alternative beneficiary supersedes the
substitute gift to A's descendants who would have taken under the
anti-lapse statute had there been no expressly designated beneficiary of
the alternative beneficiary designation who is entitled to take. 243
Scenario #2: An identical insurance policy as in Scenario #1 is
payable "to A if she survives me; if not to B," except that both nieces, A
and B, predeceased the insured and both left descendants surviving the
insured. Since A is the beneficiary of the beneficiary designation, those
descendants of A who would take a substitute gift from A under these
239. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06(2)(c) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
240. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 (1990) (amended 1993).
241. Id. These "foolproof" methods can be found in various examples in the comment to this
section of the U.P.C. Id.
242. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-06 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan I, 1996). For a more detailed
examination of the new terminology, see the new language contained in § 30.1-09.1-06(1), (2), (3).
243. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(2)(d).
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anti-lapse rules are said to take the primary substitute gift. 244 In decid-
ing whether A's descendants or B's descendants take under this scenario,
the revised law simply states that the property passes under the primary
substitute gift; therefore A's descendants take the proceeds of the policy
and not B's descendants. 245  An exception to this latter rule is made
under facts in the next scenario.
Scenario #3: An insurance policy of an insured who has died is
payable: "To my son A if he is living at my death, if not, to A's chil-
dren, X and Y." A and X predeceased the insured; A's child Y and X's
children, M and N, survived the insured. Under the new law, the gift to
A's children is termed a younger-generation substitute gift which means
the substitute gift is created with respect to a younger-generation benefi-
ciary designation. 24 6 X and Y are beneficiaries of a younger-generation
beneficiary designation because that type of designation: 1) is to a
descendant of the primary beneficiary designation; 2) is an alternative
beneficiary designation with respect to a primary beneficiary designa-
tion; 3) is a beneficiary designation for which a substitute gift is created;
and 4) would have taken effect had all the deceased beneficiaries who
left surviving descendants survived the decedent except the deceased
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the primary beneficiary designation. 24 7
A's children qualify as beneficiaries under this definition. They are
descendants of A, the beneficiary of a primary beneficiary designation.
Since A, if living would be entitled to take, the children are beneficiaries
of the alternative beneficiary designation. Since A is deceased, the class
of children is entitled to take and if one of those children would have
taken if he or she had not predeceased A, such as happened in the case
of X, then the anti-lapse statute gives the surviving descendants of X a
substitute gift. Finally, the class of children, had they all survived, would
have taken if A and those who would take substitute gifts from A under
the anti-lapse provisions were deceased. Thus, rather than follow the rule
in Scenario #2 and give some of the proceeds under the primary substi-
tute gift, the law passes the proceeds under the younger-generation gift
with one-half of the proceeds to Y and the other half of the proceeds to
M and N.248 Had the law not provided for the case of a younger genera-
tion gift, the rule in Scenario #2 would apply and would have given Y
one-half of the proceeds plus one-half of the proceeds to A; M and N
would take only one-half of one-half of the proceeds.
244. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(3)(a).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 30.I-09.1-06(3)(c)(4).
247. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.I-09.1-06(3)(c)(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
248. Id. § 30.1-09.1-06(3)(b).
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In addition to applying a comprehensive anti-lapse statute to
governing instruments, the revised law in another statute projects the
anti-lapse concept into the area of future interests in trusts. 249 The need
to apply an anti-lapse concept arises because the revised law reverses the
common law which did not imply conditions of survivorship in the case
of future interests in trust.250 The revised law specifically states, "a
future interest under the terms of a trust is contingent on the beneficia-
ry's surviving the distribution date." 251 Thus, if a trust is set up to give
the income to A for life, and the remainder to B, B must survive A in
order to qualify to take the property. At common law, B had a vested
remainder rather than a contingent remainder and if B predeceased A,
B's remainder interest would go to B's estate. Under the revised law, if
B does not survive A, the interest to B fails and thus does not go to B's
estate. To compensate in part for B losing what would otherwise at
common law be a vested interest, the revised law applies the anti-lapse
concept and saves B's interest for B's surviving descendants. 252 If B has
no surviving descendants and the interest was created in a devise in the
transferor's will, other than in the residuary clause, then the interest
passes under the residuary clause. 253 In this context, the residuary clause
is treated as creating a future interest. If the property is not disposed of
by the will, the property will pass to the transferor's heirs under the
intestate succession law. 254  If B has no surviving descendants and the
future interest is created by an exercise of a power of appointment, the
property passes by the clause that names the donor's taker-in-default. 255
In this context, such a clause is treated as creating a future interest under
the terms of a trust. 25 6  If this property does not pass to a
taker-in-default, the property passes to the transferor's devisees and/or
heirs 257
The rationale for turning what was formerly considered a vested
remainder in a trust into a contingent remainder is the need to avoid the
estate problems involved when a remainder beneficiary dies years before
the income beneficiary. At the income beneficiary's death, the estate of
the deceased remainder beneficiary has to be re-opened; in distributing
249. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07.
250. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1990) (amended 1993).
251. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(4)(a).
254. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(4)(b).
255. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(5)(a).
256. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07(5)(a) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
257. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(5)(b). The property passes as described in § 30.1-09.1-07(4). Id. In this
context, "transferor" means the donor if the power was a nongeneral or special power and means the
donee if the power was a general power. Id.
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property through this re-opened estate, other estates of deceased heirs or
devisees might have to be re-opened. Such procedures could be costly
and cumbersome. 258 However, this law reversing the common law is
applicable only to future interests in trusts. The common law still
controls future interests in other legal devices. 259 A deed transferring
farm land "to A for life, remainder to B" would in many jurisdictions
give B a vested remainder. A and B during their lifetimes could validly
sell their land and convey good title. They would not be able to do that
if their interests were created in a trust because the revised law creates a
contingent substitute gift in their descendants. 260 A person could
however set up a trust and create-a vested remainder interest by phrases
such as "income to A for life, remainder to B or B's estate" or "income
to A for life, remainder to B whether or not B survives A."261 As in the
case of the anti-lapse statute dealing with governing instruments, the
revised law warns against using ambiguous survivorship language to
defeat the anti-lapse provision of this statute, at least in the absence of
additional evidence.262
The anti-lapse provision of the revised law provides that if the
remainder beneficiary fails to survive the distribution date, a substitute
gift is created in the beneficiary's surviving descendants. 263 If the future
interest is in the form of a class gift, a substitute gift is created in the
surviving descendants of any deceased beneficiary. 264 It is not necessary
that these deceased beneficiaries be related in some way to the settlor of
the trust as is required of a deceased beneficiary under the applicable
anti-lapse statute for governing instruments, who has to be a grandparent,
a descendant of a grandparent, or a stepchild of the creator of a govern-
ing instrument in order to take the substitute gift. This law also uses
similar anti-lapse terminology and provides similar rules for solving
various problems as set forth in the three scenarios discussed with respect
to the anti-lapse statute applicable to governing instruments. 265
C. DEFINITIONS AND CONSTRUCTION OF CLASS GIFrs
The revised law alters one section dealing with the interpretation of
class gifts that are made in wills and adds a number of revised definitions
and rules of construction for class gifts. The law on this topic appears in
258. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-707 (1990) (amended 1993).
259. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
260. Id.
261. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-207 (1990) (amended 1993).
262. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(2)(c).
263. Id. § 30.1-09.1-07(2)(a).
264. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-07(2)(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
265. id. § 30.1-09.1-07(2)(d)(3). See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 72:1
NORTH DAKOTA PROBATE CODE
the chapter regulating governing instruments which, among other
documents, includes wills.266 These definitions and rules are helpful not
only in interpreting class gift terms that appear in documents but also in
drafting documents in which these terms are used. These rules control
the construction of governing instruments unless stated otherwise in
those documents or from other evidence. 267
Under both prior law and the revised law, halfbloods, adopted
persons, and persons born out of wedlock or nonmarital persons are
included in class gift terminology if they would take under the intestate
succession law, had the decedent died intestate. 268 The revised law
specifically states adopted persons and nonmarital persons are included
as well as their respective descendants if appropriate to the class.269
However, under the revised law, adopted and nonmarital children will not
be presumed included in class gift terminology in all scenarios. If a
transferor who is not the natural parent, makes a transfer to an individual
born to a natural parent, that individual is not considered the child of the
parent unless the individual lived while a minor as a regular member of
the household of that natural parent or that parent's parent, brother,
sister, spouse, or surviving spouse. 270 Likewise, if a transferor who is not
the adopting parent makes a transfer to an adopted individual, that
individual is not considered the child of the adopting parent unless the
adopted individual lived while a minor, either before or after the adop-
tion, as a regular member of the household of the adopting parent. 271
The revised law distinguishes relationships by blood from those by
affinity. If a person creates a trust to pay the income "to my nephews"
and does not distinguish between nephews related by blood or nephews
related by marriage, such as one's spouse's nephews, the presumption is
raised that only those nephews related by blood are included in the class
gift. 2 7 2
266. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
267. Id.
268. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09-11, repealed by Uniform Probate Code Changes, ch. 334, sec.
50, 1993 N.D. Laws 1143 (effective Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-05(1) (Supp. 1995)(effective Jan. 1, 1996).
269. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-05(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
270. Id. § 30.1-09.1-05(2). For example, if a grandfather gave property in his will "to my
granddaughter, it will be presumed that this class gift does not include an adopted granddaughter
unless the granddaughter lived, while a minor, as a regular member of the household of certain
relatives." To include the granddaughter in the will, the grandfather would have to name the
grandchild specifically. The revised law is based on the premise that grandparents and other
transferors would not intend adopted and nonmarital children to be included in the class gift if they did
not live with certain family members while they were minors.
271. Id. § 30.1-09.1-05(3).
272. Id. § 30.1-09.1-05(1).
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The revised law addresses the problem of interpreting class gifts
made to "descendants," "issue," or "heirs of the body" when the
document does not specify the manner in which the property is to be
distributed. In these types of multiple generation class gifts, the law
raises the presumption that property is to be "distributed among the
class members who are living when the interest is to take effect in posses-
sion or enjoyment, in such shares as they would receive, under the
applicable law of intestate succession, if the designated ancestor had then
died intestate owning the subject matter of the class gift." 273 This law
rejects the presumption that a strict per stirpes distribution system is to be
applied regardless of the applicable intestate succession law.274
The revised law also addresses the problem of construing terms such
as "heirs," "heirs at law," "next of kin," "relatives," "family" or
language of similar import that appear in certain statutes and governing
instruments. 275 If these terms are used, the presumption is that the
property passes to those persons, and in such shares as would succeed to
the designated individual's intestate estate under the intestate succession
law of the designated individual's domicile, if the designated individual
died when the disposition was to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment.276 There is one exception to this presumption. If the designated
individual's surviving spouse is living, but remarried at the time the
interest is to take effect in possession or enjoyment, the surviving spouse
is not an heir of the designated individual. 277
One area of construction that has presented problems for courts is
the use of the terms "by representation" or "per stirpes" following a
gift to a class of individuals, such as "to my brothers, per stirpes." If a
will uses these two particular terms, "by representation" or "per stir-
pes," the revised law raises the presumption that a system of strict per
stirpes is to be applied. 278 Under strict per stirpes, the initial division of
the estate is made at the first generation even if no individual survives the
ancestor. 279 For example, if a mother dies intestate, survived only by six
273. Id. § 30.1-09.1-08.
274. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-708 (1990) (amended 1993).
275. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-11 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
276. Id. This presumption is applicable to both present and future interests that are created in
favor of "heirs," "relatives," "family," etc. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id. § 30.1-09.1-09(2).
279. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-709(c) (1990) (amended 1993). The statute describes the strict per
stirpes formula as follows: If an applicable statute or a governing instrument calls for property to be
distributed "by representation" or "per stirpes," the property is divided into as many equal share as
there are surviving children of the designated ancestor and deceased children who left surviving
descendants. Id. Each surviving child is allocated one share. Id. "The share of each deceased child
with surviving descendants is divided in the same manner, with subdivision repeating at each
succeeding generation until the property is fully allocated among surviving descendants." Id. The
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grandchildren, the division of her estate will be made first at her chil-
dren's generation, by dividing the estate into as many portions as there
are deceased children who have descendants surviving their grandmoth-
er. Unless each deceased child had the same number of children, each
grandchild will not receive an equal share. If a will states that individuals
are to take property "per capita at each generation," the presumption is
that the system of representation defined in the U.P.C. is to be ap-
plied. 280 This system ensures that all individuals in each generation will
take equal shares. For example, if a grandfather dies intestate with one
child living and two deceased children, one of whom has two children
surviving their grandfather and the other deceased child has one child
surviving her grandfather, all three grandchildren will share equally in
two-thirds of their grandfather's estate. In other words, the shares that
the grandchildren's parents would have received had they been living
will be combined and shared equally with the grandchildren. 281 In order
for a will to give property to individuals to take by representation under
North Dakota definition's of representation, reference must be made
specifically to section 30.1-04-06 of the North Dakota Century Code or
the pre-1990 U.P.C.'s definition in section 2-106.282
Under the revised law, the doctrine of worthier title is abolished as a
rule of law and as a rule of construction. 283 Thus, a clause such as "to
the transferor's heirs or heirs at law," will not create a reversionary
interest in the transferor. 284
1993 amendment to the U.P.C. which was not adopted in North Dakota, revised the second sentence of
this statute to read "Each surviving child, if any, is allocated one share." Id. The Comment in the
Code states that this revision was made to clarify the point that, under per stirpes, the initial division of
the estate is made at the children generation even if no child survives the ancestor. Id.
280. N.D. CENr. CODE § 30.1-09.1-09(2) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
281. Id. The statute describes the "per capital at each generation" system of representation as
follows:
If a governing instrument calls for property to be distributed "per capita at each
generation," the property is divided into as many equal shares as there are surviving
descendants in the generation nearest to the designated ancestor which contains one or
more surviving descendants and deceased descendants in the same generation who left
surviving descendants, if any. Each surviving descendant in the nearest generation is
allocated one share. The remaining shares, if any, are combined and then divided in the
same manner among the surviving descendants of the deceased descendants as if the
surviving descendants who were allocated a share and their surviving descendants had
predeceased the distribution date.
Id.
282. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the revised law).
283. N.D. CENr. CODE § 30.1-09.1-10 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
284. Id.
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D. EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The rules for exercising a power of appointment in a will remain the
same under both the prior and revised law. Neither a general residuary
clause in a will nor a will making a general disposition of all of testator's
property will exercise a power of appointment held by the testator unless
specific reference is made to the power or there is some indication of
intention to include the property subject to the power. 285 The legisla-
ture rejected the U.P.C.'s suggestion that in the absence of a requirement
that the power be exercised by a reference, or an express or specific
reference, a general disposition or general residuary clause could also
validly exercise a power if the power is a general power and the creating
instrument does not name a taker-in-default. 28 6
A revised provision for the exercise of a power of appointment was
added in the chapter on rules of construction dealing with governing
instruments. The revised law addresses the exercise of the power in a
case in which the governing instrument creating a power of appointment
expressly requires that the power be exercised by a reference, an express
reference, or a specific reference, to the power or its source. In such a
case, the law raises the presumption that the donor's intention, in requir-
ing that the donee exercise the power by making reference to the partic-
ular power or to the creating instrument, was to prevent an inadvertent
exercise of the power.287 Thus, a blanket-exercise clause, such as "any
property over which I have a power of appointment," would not be
effective to exercise the power because there would be no sufficient
reference to the particular power. 288 Since all presumptions raised by
this chapter are subject to being rebutted, a blending clause could suffice
to exercise the power if a contrary intent is shown on the part of the
donor and/or the donee.289
VII. GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR PROBATE AND NONPROBATE
TRANSFERS
One aim of the U.P.C. is to unify the law regarding both wills and
other governing instruments. In two areas of law addressed in this
section, the U.P.C. applies to nonprobate transfers rules that have been
traditionally applicable only to wills and intestate succession. These
285. Id. § 30.1-09-10.
286. See generally UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-608 (1990) (amended 1993) (discussing the power of
appointment).
287. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-04 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
288. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-704 (1990) (amended 1993) (discussing the power of appointment
and meaning of the specific reference requirement).
289. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-09.1-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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areas are concerned with the effect of homicide committed by beneficia-
ries named in certain governing instruments, and the revocation of
nonprobate transfers by divorce. 290 The law on disclaiming interests in
property has been long available for beneficiaries of both probate and
nonprobate transfers but is now treated in one section in the U.P.C.
Finally, a section defining the term "surviving spouse" is set forth and
clarified at least for purposes of intestate succession, elective share, a
pre-marital will, exempt property, and family allowance.
A. THE RIGHT TO DISCLAIM
The North Dakota Legislature repealed its "Uniform Disclaimer of
Transfers Under Nontestamentary Instruments Act" and combined it
with prior probate law on renunciation of succession. 291 The revised law
addresses the right to disclaim interests in all property whether the
property or interest has devolved to the disclaimant under a testamentary
interest or intestate succession or under a nontestamentary instrument or
contract. 292 The revised law gives the right to disclaim in broad terms to
any person or the representative of any person to whom an interest in
property devolves by whatever means.293 Basically, the same time limits
for filing are maintained-if a present interest, not later than nine
months after death of the deceased owner or deceased donee or under a
nontestamentary instrument or contract, not later than nine months after
the effective date of the nontestamentary instrument or contract, or if a
future interest, not later than nine months after the event determining
that the taker of the property or interest is finally ascertained and the
interest is indefeasibly vested.294
To be effective, the disclaimer must be filed in the court of the
county in which proceedings for the administration of the estate of the
deceased owner or deceased donee of the power have been com-
menced. 295 A copy of the disclaimer must be delivered in person or
290. Other areas discussed previously that have applied traditional law for wills to nonprobate
transfers include the anti-lapse statue and the requirement of surviving the decedent by 120 hours in
order to take under a governing instrument. See supra notes 208-265 and accompanying text.
291. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-11.1-01 (Supp. 1995) (repealing the Act); N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-10-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996) (discussing renunciation of succession); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996) (discussing disclaimer of property
interests).
292. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
293. Id. § 30.1-10-01(1). -
294. Id. § 30.1-10-01(2)(a), (b). The prior law ran the nine-month period after the person
entitled to disclaim had "actual knowledge" of the existence of the interest whereas the new revised
law runs the time period from the time that the person "learns" of the interest. N.D. CENT. CODE §
47-11.1-02(1) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01(2)(b) (Supp.
1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
295. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01(2)(a), (b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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mailed by registered mail to any personal representative or other fiducia-
ry of the decedent or donee of the power. 296 In the case of a
nontestamentary instrument or contract, the disclaimer must be delivered
in person or mailed by registered mail to the person who has legal title to
or possession of the interest disclaimed. 297 The general rule under both
the revised and prior law is that property or interest disclaimed devolves
as if the disclaimant had predeceased the decedent or had predeceased
the effective date of the instrument or contract. 298 However, the revised
law clarifies the effect of a disclaimer in the event that by law or under
the will, the nontestamentary instrument or a contract, the descendants of
the disclaimant would share in the disclaimed interest by representation
or otherwise were the disclaimant considered to have predeceased the
decedent or to have predeceased the effective date of the
nontestamentary instrument or contract. In such event, the disclaimed
interests pass by representation, or pass as directed by the governing
instrument, to the descendants of the disclaimant who survive the dece-
dent or the effective date of the instrument.299 The purpose of the
clarification is to ensure that a person cannot disclaim in order to have
his or her descendants receive a share greater than the disclaimant would
have received had the disclaimant not exercised his or her right to
disclaim. 300
B. EFFECT OF HOMICIDE ON PROBATE AND CERTAIN NONPROBATE
TRANSFERS
The revised law dealing with the slayer/decedent relationship is more
explicit on which wrongful acquisitions of property or interest by a killer
are to be forfeited. Both the prior and revised laws have a catch-all
section that any wrongful acquisition of property by a killer not covered
by the statute is to be treated in accordance with the principle that a killer
cannot profit from any wrong.301 The revised law continues to apply to
the same transfers that were covered by the prior law-intestate succes-
296. Id.
297. Id. If real property or an interest in real property is disclaimed, a copy of the disclaimer
may be recorded in the office of the register of the deeds in the county in which the property or
interest disclaimed is located. Id. § 30.1-10-01(3).
298. N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-11.1-03 (Supp. 1995) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-10-01(3) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1,1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01(2)(a),
(b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
299. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-01(4)(a), (b) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
300. See Uniform Probate Code Practice Manual (referring to various ways that the language in
the prior law could be interpreted).
301. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(4) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996); N.D. CENT
CODE § 30.1-10-03(6) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). The new law explicitly spells out the
principle of this statute, namely, that a killer cannot profit from any wrong. Id.
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sion, wills, joint tenancies in real and personal property, joint accounts in
banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions and other institutions,
as -well as bonds, life insurance policies and other contractual relation-
ships. 302 However, the revised law rather than stating specific transfers,
covers the wrongful acquisitions by a killer in broader terms. First, the
individual who intentionally and feloniously kills the decedent "forfeits
all benefits under this title with respect to the decedent's estate." 303
"Second, the intentional and felonious killing of the decedent revokes: a)
any revocable disposition or appointment of property made by the
decedent to the killer in a governing instrument; b) any provision in a
governing instrument conferring a general or nongeneral power of
appointment on the killer; and c) any nomination of the killer in a
governing instrument, nominating or appointing the killer to serve in
any fiduciary or representative capacity. 30 4 Third, the intentional and
felonious killing severs the interests of the decedent and killer in proper-
ty held by them at the time of the killing as j9int tenants with the right of
survivorship.305 Once the wr'ngful acquisitions by the killer are identi-
fied, the traditional principle of the law applies and the killer is to be
deprived of these benefits. The prior law simply stated that probate
benefits pass as if the killer had predeceased the decedent and contractu-
al benefits become payable as though the killer had predeceased the
decedent. 306 The revised law uses a different approach stating that
decedent's intestate estate passes as if the killer disclaimed the killer's
intestate share and provisions of a governing instrument are to be given
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
303. Id. § 30.1-10-03(2). Included in these benefits under the decedent's estate are an intestate
share, an elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt
property, and a family allowance. Id.
304. Id. § 30.1-10-03(3)(a). The statute defines "revocable" to mean a disposition, appointment,
provision or nomination:
Under which the decedent, at the time of or immediately before death, was alone
empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the designation, in
favor of the killer, whether or not the decedent was then empowered to designate the
decedent in place of the decedent's killer or the decedent then had capacity to exercise
the power.
Id. § 3 0.1-10-03(l)(c). Also defined is "disposition or appointment of property" to include a transfer
of an item of property or any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument;
"governing instrument is defined as one executed by the decedent." Id. § 30.1-10-03(1)(a), (b).
Included in the term "fiduciary or representative capacity" are personal representatives, executors,
trustee and agents. Id. § 30.1-10-03(3)(a).
305. Id. § 30.1-10-03(3)(b). Unlike the prior law, the revised law explicitly states that the
severance of a joint tenancy "transforms the interests of the decedent and killer into tenancies in
common." Id. See In re Estate of Snortland, 311 N.W.2d 36, 38 (N.D. 1981) (determining that the
effect of killing covered by the statute which called for a severance of a joint tenancy, was to create a
tenancy in common).
306. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(1), (3) (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1,1996).
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effect as if the killer disclaimed all revoked provisions. 307 The purpose
of this approach is to have the law of right to disclaim apply and thus
avoid any possibility that the descendants of the killer might take more
property than the killer would have taken had there been no intentional
and felonious killing.
C. REVOCATION OF PROBATE AND NONPROBATE TRANSFERS BY
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT
The law stating that an individual who is divorced from the decedent
or whose marriage has been annulled is not a "surviving spouse"
remains basically unchanged. 308 The revised law does, however, clarify
one provision under which an individual would be estopped from
claiming that he or she is a "surviving spouse" for purposes of an
intestate share, elective share, omitted spouse's share, exempt property
and family allowance. Adding the word "invalid" to this provision, the
revised law now bars "an individual who, following an invalid decree of
judgment of divorce or annulment obtained by the decedent, participates
in a marriage ceremony with a third individual" from claiming the status
of "surviving spouse." 309 However, changes are added to the law that if
after executing a will the testator is divorced or his or her marriage is
annulled, the divorce or annulment revokes provisions in the will to the
former spouse. The revised law has been expanded to cover not only
wills but also nonprobate instruments. 310 Another change is that the
revised law bars not only a former spouse from receiving any benefits
from a decedent's transfers at death but also bars relatives of the
divorced individual's former spouse from receiving any benefits.3 11
These relatives are individuals who are related to the divorced
individual's former spouse by blood, adoption, or. affinity and who, after
the divorce or annulment, are not related to the divorced individual by
blood, adoption or affinity.312
Under the revised law, a divorce or annulment of a marriage
revokes: a) any revocable disposition or appointment of property made
by a divorced individual to the individual's former spouse in a
governing instrument; b) any disposition or appointment created by law
307. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03(2), (5) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996). Only in the
case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representative capacity, does the law state that the
killer is to be considered to have predeceased the decedent. Id. § 30.1-10-03(5).
308. Id. § 30.1-10-02. If the parties remarry and the spouse is married to the decedent at the
time of death, then that spouse would be the "surviving spouse." Id.
309. Id. § 30.1-10-02(1).
310. Id. § 30.1-08-08.
311. Id. § 30.1-10-04(2)(a).
312. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-04(1)(e) (Supp. 1995) (effective Jan. 1, 1996).
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or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced individual's
former spouse; c) any provision in a governing instrument conferring a
general or special power of appointment on the divorced individual's
former spouse or on a relative of the divorced individual's former
spouse; and d) any nomination in a governing instrument, nominating a
divorced individual's former spouse or a relative of the divorced
individual's former spouse to serve in any fiduciary or representative
capacity. 313  The divorce or annulment also severs the interests of the
former spouses in property held by them at the time of the divorce or
annulment as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. 314 When the
provisions of a governing instrument have been revoked or severed, the
effect is as if the former spouse and relatives of the former spouse
disclaimed all such provisions.315 In the case of a revoked nomination
in a fiduciary or representative capacity, the effect is as if the former
spouse and relatives of the former spouse died immediately before the
divorce or annulment.
313. Id. § 30.1-10-04(2)(a). The definition section for this new law is as follows:
1. In this section:
a. "Disposition or appointment of property" includes a transfer of an item of property or
any other benefit to a beneficiary designated in a governing instrument.
b. "Divorce or annulment" means any divorce or annulment, or any dissolution or
declaration of invalidity of a marriage, that would exclude the spouse as a surviving
spouse within the meaning of section 30.1-10-02. A decree of separation that does not
terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of this section.
c. "Divorced individual" includes an individual whose marriage has been annulled.
d. "Governing instrument" means a governing instrument executed by the divorced
individual before the divorce or annulment of the marriage to the former spouse.
e. "Relative of the divorced individual's former spouse" means an individual who is
related to the divorced individual's former spouse by blood, adoption, or affinity and
who, after the divorced or annulment, is not related to the divorced individual by blood,
adoption, or affinity.
f. "Revocable," with respect to a disposition, appointment, provision, or nomination
means one under which the divorced individual, at the time of the divorce or annulment,
was alone empowered, by law or under the governing instrument, to cancel the
designation in favor of the former spouse or former spouse's relative, whether or not the
divorced individual was then empowered to designate the divorced individual in place of
the former spouse or in place of the former spouse's relative and whether or not the
divorced individual then had the capacity to exercise the power.
Id. § 30.1-10-04(1).
314. Id. § 30.1-10-04(3). The joint tenancy with right of survivorship is transformed into a
tenancy in common. Id. The severance does not affect any third-party interest in property acquired
for value and in good faith unless a writing declaring the severance has been noted, registered, filed
or recorded in appropriate records. Id. § 30.1-10-04(4).
315. Id. § 30.1-10-04(4). The prior law merely stated that property prevented from passing to a
former spouse because of revocation by divorce or annulment passes as if the former spouse failed to
survive the decedent. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-08 (Supp. 1995) (effective until Jan. 1, 1996).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Significant changes in the probate area were proposed in the 1940s
with the Model Probate Code being published in 1946.316 The task of
redesigning probate law was undertaken by the Uniform Law
Commission in 1970317 and states, like North Dakota, have profited from
its studies and proposed changes. By adopting most of the provisions of
the revised Article II of the U.P.C., the North Dakota Legislature has
updated the law to meet the new realities of a changing American
society. One scholar has observed that the U.P.C. is very much in the
"mainstream of an ongoing evolutionary process of probate
reform." 3 18
In the course of reforming probate law, the North Dakota
Legislature might have to take another look at certain laws which either
differ from the proposed changes of the U.P.C. or with the passage of
time need to be scrutinized. If studies show that one spouse is effectively
disinherting another spouse by purchasing life insurance on the lives of
persons other than the surviving spouse, then the proceeds of such life
insurance policies might have to be included in the augmented estate.319
If the trend continues to have more assets of a deceased spouse treated as
marital property, then transfers of more property, such as a presently
exercisable general power of appointment, created by and for such
deceased spouse both before and during the marriage might have to be
included in the augmented estate. 320
The two themes promoted by the revised Article II of the U.P.C. of
eliminating stringent formalities in the probate area and unifying the law
of probate and nonprobate transfers point in the direction of applying to
wills the same law applicable to other legal devices for transferring
property including those devices used in business transactions. Foremost
316. Averill & Brantley, supra note 4, at 636.
317. Id. at 637.
318. Mary Louise Fellows, Traveling the Road to Probate Reform: Finding the Way to Your Will,
77 MICH. L. REV. 639. 681 (1993); Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and
Better, or More Like the Internal Revenue Code, 77 MINN. L. REv. 639, 642 (1993). See Martin D.
Begleiter, Article 1I of the U.P.C. and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN. L. REV. 101, 102-03
(1991) (commenting on the fact that the U.P.C. has clarified the law in many areas with the exception
of the anti-lapse statute and concluding that the many improvements in the U.P.C. should lessen the
claims of malpractice litigation).
319. U.P.C. §§ 2-205(1)(iv), 2-205 (l)(3)(ii) (1990) (amended 1993). Like North Dakota,
Montana does not require insurance policies and annuity plans payable to persons other than the
deceased's surviving spouse to be included in the augmented estate. Minnesota requires insurance,
annuity contracts, and retirement plans to be included in the augmented estate. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
524.2-205 (West Supp. 1995).
320. U.P.C. § 2-205(1)(i) (1990) (amended 1993). See Rena C. Sepolwitz, Transfers Prior to
Marriage and the Uniform Probate Code's Redesigned Elective Share - Why the Partnership is Not Yet
Complete, 25 IND. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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among these laws applicable to nonprobate transfers is the dispensing
power or the substantial compliance doctrines which would allow, for
example, a will that was not executed according to the statute of wills to
be, nonetheless, valid under certain circumstances. 321 The law already
recognizes that a provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in an
insurance policy, promissory note, mortgage, pension plan, trust, deed of
gift, property settlement and other written instruments of a similar nature
is nontestamentary. 322 As stated in the U.P.C.'s Comment:
The drafters of the original Uniform Probate Code declared in
the Comment that they were unable to identify policy reasons
for continuing to treat these varied arrangements as
testamentary. The drafters said that the benign experience with
such familar will substitutes as the revocable intervivos trust, the
multiple-party bank account and United States government
bonds payable on death to named beneficiaries all
demonstrated that the evils envisioned if the statute of wills
were not rigidly enforced simply do not materialize. The
Comment also observed that because these provisions often are
part of a business transaction and are evidenced by a writing,
the danger of fraud is largely eliminated. 323
How long it will take for the states to recognize a will as one legal
device among many others for transferring property at death and to treat
all devices equally remains to be seen. Most statutes of wills, even those
which require minimum formalities, still keep wills on a pedestal above
nonprobate devices. 324
The North Dakota Legislature might also consider three other
changes promoted by the U.P.C. Under current law only a surviving
spouse or minor children whose deceased spouse or parent in whom the
title to real property constituting a homestead is vested, is entitled to a
321. U.P.C. § 2-503 (1990) (amended 1993).
322. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-31-01 (Supp. 1995). More specifically this statute states:
A provision for a nonprobate transfer on death in an insurance policy, contract of
employment, bond, mortgage, promissory note, certificated or uncertificated security,
account agreement, custodial agreement, deposit agreement, compensation plan, trust,
conveyance, deed of gift, marital property agreement, or other written instrument of a
similar nature is nontestamentary.
Id. The term in this law "or other written instrument of a similar nature" replaced former
language which the U.P.C. Comment states was interpreted incorrectly by one court but correctly by
another in First National Bank in Minot v. Bloom, 264 N.W.2d 208, 212 (N.D. 1978). U.P.C. § 6-101
cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
323. U.P.C. § 6-101 cmt. (1990) (amended 1993).
324. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (Supp. 1995) (effective January 1, 1996). See Voeller, 543
N.W.2d at 26.
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homestead estate. 325 The legislature, following the U.P.C., could adopt a
homestead allowance of a set amount, such as $15,000, for every
surviving spouse or minor child either in lieu of or in addition to the
homestead estate exemption. 326  Second, the legislature could adopt a
comprehensive anti-lapse statute for wills which would answer a number
of construction questions that have arisen under the pre-1990 anti-lapse
statute which currently remains in effect. 327 Third, in the case of
intestacy, if studies show that persons would want all those related to
them in the same degree of kinship to take equally, the legislature might
adopt the per capita system of representation. 328
The adoption of the Uniform Marital Property Act would have a
significant impact on probate law. 329 This Act calls for shared and
vested ownership rights in marital property which would be in place not
only at the time of divorce but also at death. 330 The Act is not identical
to but does parallel sharing under community property systems. 331 In
one section of the U.P.C. there is an alternative provision for community
states.332
In sum, it has been the experiences with the pre-1990 law and
various developments, such as the rise in multiple marriages with persons
having step-children and children from previous marriages, that have
prompted the present changes. 333 In the forthcoming years, it can be
expected that the current revised law will also be subject to a similar
review.
325. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-16-02 (1976).
326. U.P.C. § 2-402 (1990) (amended 1993).
327. U.P.C. § 2-603 (1990) (amended 1993). The North Dakota Legislature adopted a
comprehensive anti-lapse statute applicable to governing instruments. N.D. CENT. CODE §
30.1-09.1-06 (effective Jan. 1, 1996) (Supp 1995).
328. U.P.C. § 2-106 (1990) (amended 1993).
329. 9A U.L.A. 103 (1987).
330. 9A U.L.A. Prefatory Note 99 (1987).
331. Id.
332. U.P.C. § 2-102A (1990) (amended 1993).
333. U.P.C. pref. note, art. II revisions (1990) (amended 1993).
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